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PRE-GROSS INCOME ADJUSTMENTS AND
THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE HAS PITTSBURGH MILK TURNED SOUR?
RicHARD H. HuNT, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

Though it is generally agreed that the sixteenth amendment authorizes
Congress to levy income taxation upon gross income,' the federal income tax,
as conceived and first drafted by Congress and as continued to the present date,
imposes taxation on net income. 2 Despite Congress' continued commitment to
the net income tax, the courts continue to remind us that the statutory deductions by which gross income is reduced to net, or taxable, income are acts of
legislative grace.3 As such, deductions may be taken away by Congress. Moreover, taxpayers claiming the benefit of statutory deductions must demonstrate
compliance with the terms on which Congress has conditioned the privilege.
Though deductions from gross income might have been conceived simply
to reduce gross income to the net income base to which the rate was to be
applied, it was eventually recognized that, viewed as a system of economic
sanctions and rewards, the income tax has a potential for either supporting or
frustrating a variety of social and economic goals. This view of the tax spawned
OBA., Yale University, 1959; LL.B., University of Florida, 1962; LL.M. (Tax), New York
University, 1965. The author wishes to express his sincere appreciation to his associate, Glenda
H. Gallagher, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. The sixteenth amendment to the Constitution gave Congress the power "to lay and
collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived," without apportionment among the
States. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XVI.
2. The sixteenth amendment neither prohibited a tax on gross income nor sanctioned one
on net income; however, Congress, by specifically providing for deductions, has chosen to tax
"net income.' "'Entire net income,' 1915, 1916 Acts; 'net income,' 1918-1938 Acts, I.R.C. 1959;
'taxable income,' I.R.C. 1954:' Diamond, The Relevance (or Irrelevance) of Public Policy in
Disallowance of Income Tax Deductions,44 TAxEs 803, 805 n.15 (1966). In fact, an oft-quoted
statement by Senator Williams at the time the Revenue Act of 1913 was enacted, states the
object of the income tax as "to tax a man's net income; that is to say, what he has at the end of
the year after deducting from his receipts his expenditures or losses. It is not to reform men's
moral characters; that is not the object of the bill at all. The tax is not levied for the purpose
of restraining people from betting on horse races or upon 'futures,' but the tax is framed for
the purpose of making a man pay upon his net income, his actual profit during the year:' 50
CONG. REC. 3849 (1915).
5. See New Colonial Ice Co., Inc. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 455, 440 (1954); Interstate
Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590, 595 (1945). For other cases citing the proposition
that deductions are a matter of legislative grace, see cases cited at 4A J. MEsTas, LAw oF
FEDEMRAL
INCOME TAxATION (1972 ed.), §25.03 n.16.3.
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the suggestion that a statutory deduction should be viewed not only as a
mechanical means for reducing gross income, but also as a "subsidy" by the
federal government for the activities associated with the deductible expenditures. If those activities were inimical to sharply defined social or economic
policies of the state or federal government, allowance of federal income tax
deductions for those expenditures could be seen as contributing to the frustration of those policies.
The idea that deductions ought not be allowed where their economic effect
might tend to frustrate public policy found a willing advocate in the Commissioner, who readily saw that the disallowance of deductions on grounds of
public policy could have a positive effect in enhancing the public revenues.
Under his sponsorship, and beginning with the early case of Sarah Backer,4 the
courts began to fashion the "public policy" doctrine as a "judicial gloss" on the
deduction statutes.5 Grounded upon the judicial presumption" that Congress
could not have intended that its laws be construed in a manner which might
frustrate national or state policies, the doctrine found general acceptance in
all courts by 1950.7 Though diverse approaches by the courts tended to give the
doctrine an amorphous quality,8 the Supreme Court, in several decisions from
1943 to 1966, provided some direction for and, fortunately, established some
limitations in the use and application of the doctrine. 9
This article considers a particular application of the public policy doctrine
which the Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider: whether public
purpose considerations may be invoked to disallow adjustments which by their
nature are accounted for as offsets in the calculation of gross income. Such
adjustments, spoken of hereinafter as "pre-gross income adjustments," clearly
lie outside that area identified with legislative grace; though Congress might
take away the statutory deductions which reduce gross income to net income,
the courts have never sanctioned the argument that Congress, acting under
authority of the sixteenth amendment, could lay an income tax on gross
receipts, or gross sales.10 To the contrary, the courts have assiduously avoided
4. Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924).
5. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.).
6. "We do not believe that it is in the interest of sound public policy that the commission
of illegal acts should be so far protected or recognized that their cost is regarded as a legitimate and proper deduction in the computation of net income under the revenue laws of the
United States." Sarah Backer, 1 B.T.A. 214, 217 (1924).
7. For a discussion of the cases developing the public policy doctrine, see text accompanying notes 15-41 infra.
8. Public policy has been described as "a very unruly horse .... [W]hen you get astride
it you never know where it will carry you." Richardson v. Mellish, 2 Bing. 229, 252, 130 Eng.
Rep. 294, 303 (1824) (Burrough, J.). Felix Frankfurter described public policy as a "portmanteau" phrase, which contains a "miscellaneous assortment of ideas." See Diamond, supra
note 2, at 803 n.3 (citing Frankfurter, "Self Willed Judges and the Judicial Function" in
A. WESTIN, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT 450 (1963)). Diamond states: "It is
because of this unruliness and its portmanteau character that 'public policy' has been a
troublesome concept in the tax field from its very beginning and has spawned so much litigation and critical comment." Diamond, supra note 2, at 803 n.2.
9. See text accompanying notes 15-41 infra.

10. See note 2 supra.
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giving approval to the "creation" of fictional income for taxation, or to the
application of the income tax to receipts representing a return of capital.,
An examination of case law supports the argument that the public policy
doctrine, having arisen in the tax law as a judicial gloss on the deduction
statutes, was always intended to have a scope of application limited, at the top,
by gross income. Nevertheless, the Commissioner has contended at various
times that pre-gross income adjustments should also be limited by the public
policy doctrine. While the courts have generally rejected this view, there have
been some exceptions. Until recently those exceptions have not seemed significant enough to call for an article focusing on this narrow question.
Since the Tax Reform Act of 1969,12 which codified public purpose limitations on section 162 deductions from gross income, the Commissioner has
mounted a concerted effort to extend the scope of the public policy doctrine
to the area of pre-gross income adjustments. As part of this effort he has
adopted regulations, withdrawn acquiescences and substituted nonacquiescences
to old decisions, and launched a broad based and vigorous campaign to relitigate issues long considered settled. Moreover, at least one recent Tax Court
opinion's gives evidence that his persistent efforts have produced some judicial
doubts as to the principles that dictate opposite tax results for illegal payments
depending upon whether they are classified as above or below the gross income
line.14
In the author's view, the application of the public policy doctrine so as
to disallow pre-gross income adjustments is fraught with serious constitutional
problems. Of perhaps equal importance, such application leads to a general
blurring of the fundamental distinctions between pre-gross income adjustments
and deductions from gross income, thus creating distortions in the law affecting many other issues. The purpose of this article, therefore, is to examine this
rather narrow aspect of the public policy doctrine and to set forth support for
the author's view that its scope is, and should continue to be, limited to deductions from gross income.
Tim PUBLIC POLICY DOCrRINE AS DELINEATED
OF THE SUPREME COURT

IN DECIsIoNS

Between 1940 and 1970, the Commissioner's efforts to broaden the scope of
the public policy doctrine met with considerable success. A body of law developed approving the disallowance of deductions, otherwise allowable under
the terms of the statutes, on grounds of public policy. The public policy
doctrine developed principally in three major areas: (1) fines, penalties and
damage payments; (2) expenses incurred in connection with criminal activities;
(3) bribes (governmental and commercial) and kickbacks.5
11. For a discussion of the Commissioner's attempts to disallow pre-gross income adjustments on public policy grounds, see text accompanying notes 43-121 infra.
12. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, tit. IX, §902, 83 Stat. 648 (1969), 1969-3 C.B.
147 (codified at I.R.C. §§162(c), (f), and (g)).
15. James Alex, 70 T.C. 322 (1978).
14. See text accompanying notes 197-204 infra.
15. For an analysis of the decisional law in these areas, see Diamond, supra note 2, at 803;
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These three categories of expenditures represent, for the most part, claims
of deductions as ordinary and necessary expenses paid in the conduct of a trade
or business. The cases in these areas reflect the tension between congressional
intent to tax only net income and judicial refusal to "presume that the
Congress, in allowing deductions for income tax purposes, intended to encourage a business enterprise to violate the declared policy" 16 of the state or
federal government. While an exhaustive examination of all decisions reflecting
the application of public policy considerations to deny deductions is beyond
the scope of this article, a brief survey of the major Supreme Court decisions
is necessary in order to delineate the scope of the doctrine.
Fines,Penaltiesand DamagesPayments
In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,17 the taxpayer, a corporation
which leased a fleet of tank trucks with drivers to motor carriers for transportation of bulk fuels, violated state maximum weight limits for motor vehicles.
During the year in question, the taxpayer paid fines and costs for those violations and sought to deduct the payments as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenditures.18 The company demonstrated that it could not have operated
profitably if it had complied with state law. Affirming the Tax Court and the
Third Circuit in disallowing the deduction claimed, the Supreme Court engrafted the public policy doctrine onto the statutory term "ordinary and
necessary." The Court stated: "A finding of 'necessity' cannot be made however, if allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national or
state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof."'11
Finding a clearly expressed policy, evidenced by penal statutes enacted to
protect highways from damage and to ensure public safety, the Court reasoned
that "to allow the deduction ...would but encourage continued violations of
state law by increasing the odds in favor of noncompliance."20 Reflecting the
emerging philosophy that a tax deduction should be viewed as a federal "subsidy" for the activity furthered by the expenditure, the Court summarized the
decisional precedents with approval as follows: "Deduction of fines and penalties uniformly has been held to frustrate state policy in severe and direct

Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 TAXEs 808
(1964); Lindsay, Tax Deductions and Public Policy, 41 TAXES 711 (1963); Paul, The Use of
Public Policy by the Commissioner in DisallowingDeductions, 1954 U. So. CAL. TAX INsT. 715;
Tyler, Disallowance of Deductionson Public Policy Grounds, 20 TAX L. REv. 665 (1965); Note,
Public Policy and Federal Income Tax Deductions, 51 COLUM. L. REv. 752 (1951); Note, Deduction of Business Expenses: Illegality and Public Policy, 54 HARV. L. REV. 852 (1941); Note,
Income Tax Deductibility of Expenses Relating to Illegal Activity, 19 TAx L. Rzv. 109 (1963);
Comment, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning
with the InternalRevenue Code, 72 YAL.a L.J. 108 (1962).
16. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958).
17. Id.
18. I.R.C. §162(a).
19. 356 U.S. at 33-34.
20. Id. at 35.
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fashion by reducing the 'sting' of the penalty prescribed by the state legislature."

21

Expenses Incurred in Connection with CriminalActivity

In applying the test whether the allowance of the deduction would "frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of
conduct,"22 the courts typically analyzed the relationship of the expense for
which a deduction was claimed to the taxpayer's illegal activities.23 As the
Supreme Court noted in Commissioner v. Heininger,24 "It has never been

thought.., that the mere fact that an expenditure bears a remote relation to
an illegal act makes it nondeductible." 25 In Heininger, the Court approved a
deduction for legal fees and costs incurred by a dentist in his unsuccessful
effort to resist an administrative action by the Post Office Department to deny
him access to the United States mails for his mail order business. The action
was predicated upon an administrative finding of fraudulent practices in the
dentist's advertising claims. The Court, noting that the dentist was threatened
with the total destruction of his business, refused to hold that legal expenses
incurred in resisting the governmental action were not ordinary and necessary.
Analyzing the federal statute violated by the taxpayer, the Court found that
the statute's purpose was not to deter persons charged with violations from
employing counsel to assist in presenting a bona fide defense to a proposed
fraud order. The Court reasoned that to allow the deduction of the litigation
expenses would not frustrate the purpose of the act.
In Commissionerv. Tellier,28 some twenty-three years later, the Court again
considered the question of the deductibility of attorney's fees, this time in a
situation where the fees were incurred in maintaining an unsuccessful defense
to criminal charges including securities fraud, mail fraud, and conspiracy.
Finding the fees to have been incurred in connection with the taxpayer's business,27 the Court again concluded that their deductibility did not frustrate any
sharply defined national policy.25 Concluding that Congress had neither provided for nor intended the disallowance of those deductions by authorizing
punishment for violation of the laws in question, the Court refused to distort
the income tax laws to reach such a result.
21. Id. In another case dealing with the violation of state maximum weight laws by
interstate carriers, Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 US. 38 (1958), although
the violations were inadvertent, the Court found the payment of the fines was not "necessary"
to the operation of the taxpayer's business, and thus no deduction was permissible. The Court
would have disallowed the deduction even if the taxpayer had acted with all due care and
without willful intent since allowance would have directly and severely frustrated state policy.

22. 356 U.S. at 33.
23. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. at 33-34. See Commissioner v.
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467,474 (1943).
24. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
25. Id. at 474.
26. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
27. The fees were conceded by the Commissioner to be ordinary and necessary. Id. at 689.

28. The act of employing a lawyer to help in one's defense when faced with serious
criminal charges does not offend public policy, the Court noted. Rather than being proscribed
conduct, the right to employ counsel is constitutionally given. Id. at 694.
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In its decisions, the Supreme Court particularly rejected the concept that
an illegal business activity was to be denied all business deductions and thus
was to be taxable on its gross income. In Commissioner v. Sullivan,29 the taxpayers operated a Chicago bookmaking establishment in violation of Illinois
law. The state statute specified that the acts performed by taxpayers' employees,
as well as the payment of rent for the illegal use of the premises, were also
illegal. Based on that statute, the Tax Court approved disallowance of deductions for wages and rent. Affirming the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' reversal of the Tax Court, the Supreme Court stated:
If we enforce as federal policy the rule espoused by the Commissioner in
this case, we would come close to making this type of business taxable on
the basis of its gross receipts, while all other business would be taxable
on the basis of net income. If that choice is to be made, Congress should
do it. The amounts paid as wages to employees and to the landlord as
rent are "ordinary and necessary expenses" in the accepted meaning of
the words.3 0
Noting that the Treasury Regulations under the Internal Revenue Code of
1939 made the federal excise tax paid on wagers by persons engaged in the
lottery business deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense,3' the
Court found recognition in those regulations "of a gambling enterprise as a
business for federal tax purposes."3 2 A federal policy which allowed a deduction for the tax paid to conduct a gambling business was seen by the Court as
"sufficiently hospitable" to allow normal deductions for wages and rent in that
business. 33 Since the activities for which the deductions were claimed did not
contravene federal policy and since the denial of the salary and rent deductions
would render the business taxable on its gross income, the Court declined to
enforce the state policy to the extent of denying the deductions.3'
29. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 29.
TREAS. REG. 118, §39.23(a)(1) (enacted under Int. Rev. Code of 1939).
356 U.S. at 29.
Id.
34. In a separate category of public policy cases which one author termed as not made up
of true public policy cases, Tyler, Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy Grounds, 20
TAx L. REv. 665, 670 (1965), certain expense were denied deductibility on the basis of a
long-standing Treasury regulation. Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S.
326 (1941), involved the deductibility of lobbying expenses which were not illegal under state
or federal law, but for which a specific Treasury Regulation denied deductibility. TRAsS. REG.
74, §262 (1928) (now TREAs. RE. 1.162-20 (1965)). Finding that the Treasury Regulations
were sufficient expression of public policy to support disallowance of the expense in question,
the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals holding that the deduction
was proper, and denied the deductibility of the lobbying expense as an "ordinary and necessary" expense. In a later case concerning deductibility of lobbying expenses, Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959), the Court reaffirmed its Textile Mills holding that the
Treasury Regulation's interpretation of "ordinary and necessary" as excluding amounts spent
to influence legislation constituted an expression of a sharply defined national policy. Moreover, the Court found tacit approval of those regulations by Congress since the statutory
provisions underlying them had been repeatedly reenacted by Congress without any criticism
of the policy expressed in the regulations.
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Bribesand Kickbacks
By contrast, the decisions in the area of bribes and kickbacks reveal a
judicial leaning in the direction of disallowance, in some cases even where the
payment did not violate a specific state law.3 5 The Supreme Court set an example of restraint, however, in Lilly v. Commissioner.-6 In that case the taxpayers were opticians who paid fees to eye doctors for referrals of patients need-

ing prescription eyeglasses. The taxpayers claimed deduction for the referral
fees, which were paid pursuant to an established custom in the industry, as
ordinary and necessary business expenses.

Reversing the Fourth Circuit, which had affirmed disallowance of the
deductions by the Tax Court, the Supreme Court observed that the referral
fee payments were "of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business
involved," and "reflected a nationwide practice."37 The Tax Court had made
no contrary findings of fact. Moreover, the payments themselves violated no
federal or state law.38

Though expressly denying any approval of the business ethics reflected in
the payment of the referral fees, the Supreme Court upheld the taxpayers'
deduction of those fees. Recognizing that the practice had been widely condemned by organized professional associations, the Court concluded that the
standards which those organizations espoused "do not, however, in themselves
constitute the 'sharply defined national or state policies' the frustration of
which may, as a matter of law, preclude... deductibility."39 In so deciding,
the Court confirmed that as a prerequisite to the denial of deductions under
the public policy doctrine the public policy offended by the expenditure in
question would have to be evidenced by a governmental pronouncement of
the policy.
Whatever uncertainties might have existed in the pre-1969 decisional scope
of the public purpose doctrine, a common thread linking the decisions is the
principle that the public policy exception applies only to deductions traditionally held to be extensions of legislative grace. Given, as the Supreme Court
had observed in United States v. Sullivan4° and other cases, 41 that Congress
could tax gross income under the sixteenth amendment, the courts have
strongly resisted the notion that Congress can tax gross receipts under that
amendment. 42 Accordingly, those adjustments to gross receipts which occur
35. See Dixie Machine Welding & Metal Works, Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439, 1963-1
US. Tax Cas. 19355 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963).
86. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
37. Id. at 93.
38. The Court said that had the payments violated state or federal law, "it could be

argued that the outlawed expenditures, by virtue of their illegality, were not ordinary and
necessary business expenses...." Id. at 95.
39. Id. at 97.
40. United States v. Sullivan, 274 US. 259 (1927) (taxing profits, not gross receipts, from
liquor traffic in violation of the National Prohibition Act).
41. See Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 371 (1934); Tyee Realty Co. v.
Anderson, 240 US. 115 (1916); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
42. See 1 J. MfRTENs, LAW OF FE mAL INcomz TAXATION §5.10 (1974 ed.), for a discussion

of the distinction between receipts and income.
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prior to arriving at gross profit are clearly regarded by the courts as falling outside the constitutional reach of Congress.
THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE AND PRE-GRoss INCOME ADJUSTMENTS

Although the Supreme Court played an active role in developing the public
policy doctrine as a basis for the disallowance of deductions, it has never
directly considered whether pre-gross income adjustments could be disallowed
solely on the basis that their allowance would frustrate sharply defined public
policy. Nevertheless, during the last thirty years the question has arisen in two
distinct contexts in the lower courts. Since Congress did not address this question in its 1969 and 1971 public policy legislation, an examination of the
earlier decisions is an appropriate prelude to a discussion of the controlling
legal principles.
Decisions Under Wartime Price ControlLaws
The earliest decision on an issue resulting from the Commissioner's attempt
to disallow a pre-gross income adjustment on grounds of public policy is Lela
Sullenger 4 3 a case which involved wartime price controls. In that case, the
Commissioner had refused to permit the petitioner to include as cost of goods
sold the excess over the Office of Price Administration's (O.P.A.) ceiling price
paid by petitioner for meats which he resold to customers during the years in
question. The Commissioner argued that the amounts paid in excess of the
O.P.A. prices were, in reality, nothing more than a "bribe" to the petitioner's
suppliers, calculated to induce them to sell meats to petitioner at the O.P.A.
ceiling price. Consistent with this highly theoretical approach, the Commissioner argued that those excess amounts, or "bribes," should be considered
comparable to deductions, the allowance of which, in the circumstances of this
case, would frustrate clearly defined public policy.
The court found that the amounts in question were actually part of the
negotiated price of meats, and thus constituted a portion of cost of goods sold.
Since the petitioner was not claiming those amounts as a business deduction,
the Tax Court concluded that the beginning premise of the Commissioner's
argument was unsound, and held for the petitioner:
Section 23 makes no provision for the cost of goods sold, but the Commissioner has always recognized, as indeed he must to stay within the
Constitution, that the cost of goods sold must be deducted from gross
receipts in order to arrive at gross income. No more than gross income
can be subjected to income tax upon any theory .... It is unnecessary to
discuss cases
involving deductions, since this case does not involve any
44
deduction.
Three years later the Tax Court followed the Sullenger decision in the case
of Benjamin Weisman involving a similar fact situation. 45 On appeal to the
43. 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
44. Id. at 1077.
45. Benjamin Weisman, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 5118,293 (1951), aff'd, 197 F.2d 221 (1st Cir.
1952).
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First Circuit, the Commissioner challenged the Sullenger rule maintaining that
expenditures for purchases, to the extent they were in violation of price control
laws, may not be claimed either as an offset to gross income or as a deduction
from gross income in computing taxable income. A constitutional issue was
framed with the Commissioner contending that disallowance of such illegal
purchase prices was permitted by the Constitution while the taxpayer contended that such a disallowance of any portion of cost of goods sold would

contravene the sixteenth amendment. Moreover, the Commissioner asserted
and the taxpayer denied that Congress intended that payments in excess of
lawful O.P.A. prices would not constitute offsets to gross income in the computation of tax liability.
The First Circuit avoided passing on the constitutional questions raised,
resting its decision for the taxpayer on the ground that Congress had never
intended that such over-ceiling payments be disallowed as cost of goods sold.
In support of its conclusion, the court pointed to two specific enactments
which indicated that Congress was aware of the device of disallowing illegal
costs in computing tax liability as a means of procuring compliance with price
control legislation. 46 In the Stabilization Act of 194247 Congress took cognizance
of this deterrent by authorizing the President to disallow excessive wage payments in calculating costs and bases for tax purposes. Also, the Defense Production Act of 1950,48 another price stabilization measure enacted by Congress
under its war powers, expressly authorized the President to prescribe the
extent to which any payment made in violation of established price ceilings
should be disregarded in determining costs or expenses for any purpose, "in49
cluding bases in determining gain for tax purposes."
Thus convinced that Congress was familar with the disallowance device as
a deterrent and could have used it but chose not to in the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942,50 the court concluded that Congress had not intended to
disallow the illegal portion of the purchase price of goods as cost of goods sold
in computing tax liability. Moreover, the court saw a "serious constitutional
question" implicit in disallowing items representing the cost of goods sold.51
"It must be remembered that we are construing a tax measure and not a penal
statute," the court noted. "Furthermore, it is a tax on income and not a tax
on gross receipts which is under consideration here."52 Viewing the question in
this light, the First Circuit was unwilling to infer that Congress intended the
disallowance of the over-ceiling portion of the purchase price as cost of goods
sold.
A special concurring opinion written by Judge Magruder expressed concern
that the majority had implied that Congress could not have constitutionally
provided for the disallowance of excess purchase price in the computation of
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

197 F.2d at 222-23.
Stabilization Act of 1942, ch. 578, §5, 56 Stat. 767 (1942).
Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, tit. IV, §405, 64 Stat. 807 (1950).
Id.
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, ch. 26, tit. I, §4, 56 Stat. 28 (1942).
197 F.2d at 224.
Id. at 228.
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cost of goods sold.53 He opined that such a provision, if included in the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, would have been valid as an additional
sanction for the violation of that law. By comparison, he noted, penal sanctions
already provided in that Act were much more onerous than the disallowance of
over-ceiling prices in the cost of goods sold for purposes of computing income
tax liability. If Congress had chosen such a sanction to be enforced as part of
the revenue laws, Judge Magruder asserted that this course would not have
caused the sanction itself to come into conflict with the sixteenth amendment."
In this respect, he seemed to draw a distinction between measures which Congress could enact as part of the income tax laws under the sixteenth amendment
and non-tax legislation imposing sanctions enforceable by tax administrators.
Having thus recorded his views on the constitutional questions, Judge
Magruder then agreed with the conclusion of the majority that Congress had
neither imposed nor implied the sanction which the Commissioner was attempting to implement in the case under consideration, noting "[i]t is not for
the Commissioner or the courts to add a further sanction which Congress did
not choose to provide."6 5,
Judge Magruder's opinion was quite likely motivated by concern that the
majority opinion might have inadvertently prejudged an important issue not
before the court, namely, the validity of those provisions of the Stabilization
Act of 1942 and the Defense Production Act of 1950 which expressly authorized
disallowance, in calculating costs and bases for income tax purposes, of the
illegal excess of prices paid for wages and goods. He clearly believed that the
question, when presented in a future case,56 would be governed by different
considerations than those involved in construing the general income tax laws.
A similar issue concerning cost of goods sold arose in the Fourth Circuit,
in Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile, Inc. 57 In this case, the taxpayer, a used
car dealer, had purchased automobiles for amounts in excess of ceiling prices
determined by the price administrator under the Emergency Price Control Act
of 1942. As was to be repeated in the later Weisman case in the First Circuit,
the litigants raised constitutional issues resulting from the Commissioner's disallowance of the over-ceiling portion of petitioner's purchase price as cost of
goods sold. While the court noted the constitutional issue, as well as the conflicting views of the parties relating to the distinctions between "cost" and
"deductions," it rested its decision for the taxpayer squarely on the ground that
Congress intended to tax as income from the sales in question only the difference between the sales price and the actual cost of the goods sold, even though
part of that cost was incurred unlawfully. In reaching this conclusion, the court
scrutinized the Internal Revenue Act and the Treasury Regulations thereunder
and found no indication that the term "cost" was intended to be understood in

53.
54.
55.
56.
(1951),
57.

Id. at 224-26.
Id.
Id. at 226.
That issue was presented to the Tax Court in Weather-Seal Mfg. Co., 16 T.C. 1312
aif'd per curiam, 199 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1952). See text accompanying notes 66-81 infra.
197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952).
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other than its ordinary economic sense.58 Next examining the Emergency Price
Control Act itself, the court noted that while the Act provided both civil and
criminal penalties for its violation, it was silent as to the tax consequences of
any such violation. 59
Based on the absence of any provision in the Act imposing cost disallowance
as a sanction for violations, and in light of its interpretation of the meaning

of "cost" under the Internal Revenue Act, the court declared itself unwilling
to "read into" the Internal Revenue laws or the price control laws a provision
which would result in disallowance of any portion of cost of goods sold in the
computation of gross income.60
The Sullenger issue came before the Fifth Circuit in four cases; the first
to be decided was Commissioner v. Guminski.61 In a short opinion the Fifth
Circuit held that the taxpayer was entitled to include as cost of goods sold, the
portion of the cost of meat purchased which was in excess of applicable price
ceilings established under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. The court
announced that it was in agreement with, and would follow, the Weisman and
Anderson Oldsmobile decisions by the First and Fourth Circuits. The other
three cases, involving similar issues, were decided in per curiam affirmances
following Guminsi.62
Although the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 did not contain provisions calling for the disallowance as cost of goods sold of the illegal portion
of the purchase price of goods, the Act did contain a provision which authorized the President to prescribe "the extent to which any wage or salary payment made in contravention of such regulations shall be disregarded ... in
determining the costs or expenses of any employer for the purposes of any other
law or regulation."0 3 Pursuant to this provision in the Act, the President issued
an Executive Order"I which included a directive to all governmental agencies
"in determining the costs or expenses of any employer ... for the purpose of
calculating deductions under the Revenue Laws of the United States" 65 to dis"
regard any wage or salary payment in contravention of the Executive Order or
the Act itself.
In Weather-Seal Manufacturing Co.,66 the question before the Tax Court
was whether the petitioner could include as part of cost of goods sold amounts
which it had paid as direct cost labor wages in excess of price ceilings prescribed under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. The taxpayer asserted
that the Executive Order discussed above had used the term "deductions,"
which term excluded wages falling in the category of cost of goods sold. The
58. Id. at 505-506.
59. Id. at 506.
60. Id.
61. 198 F.2d 265 (5th Cir. 1952).
62. Commissioner v. Conner, 199 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Baum, 199
F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1952); Commissioner v. Gentry, 198 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1952).

63. Stabilization Act of 1942, ch. 578, §5, 56 Stat. 767 (1942).
64. Exec. Order No. 9250, 1942-2 C.B. 92.
65. Id.at 93.
66. 16 T.C. 1312 (1951), affd per curiam, 199 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1952).
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Commissioner had disallowed the unlawfully excessive amount of wages as an
adjustment of any kind in computing income tax liability.
Petitioner contended that the Commissioner had acted without authorization under the law and the Executive Order or, in the alternative, that the
Executive Order and the law itself were both in conflict with the sixteenth
amendment.
The petitioner's position clearly jeopardized the legislative purpose underlying the Act. If the Tax Court were to restrict the disallowance of illegal
wages to that category of wages deductible from gross income under section
23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code6- and exclude from the scope of the Executive
Order those direct cost wages properly accounted for in cost of goods sold, a
loophole would be carved in the Price Control Act by the creation of a class
of wages immune from the sanction prescribed by the law. On the other hand,
if the Tax Court were to construe the Act and Executive Order as treating all
wages equally thereunder, the petitioner's sixteenth amendment claim would
threaten the validity of both the Executive Order and the Act. Thus, in 1951,
with the nation in the throes of the Korean conflict, the Tax Court was confronted with a direct challenge to an emergency measure enacted by Congress
under its war powers in an effort to maintain a stable national economy.
Though the law in question in Weather-Seal had been enacted years before
during World War II, the case at bar would very likely stand as precedent for
similar issues which would inevitably arise under statutes enacted during the
Korean conflict that were similar in purpose and content to the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942.
In this context, the Tax Court reached a desirable result by upholding the
validity of the Act and Executive Order without excluding direct cost wages
from the scope of the tax sanction intended to enforce wage ceilings.68 Unfortunately, in reaching that result it produced an opinion which warped both
doctrine and logic.
The court first dealt with the petitioner's claim that the Executive Order
intended to disallow unlawful wages only to the extent that they fell within
the category ordinarily allowed as deductions from gross income. The taxpayer
had asserted that since the wages in question were paid for direct labor,
properly included in cost of goods sold, they were not of a nature which would
fall within the scope of the Executive Order. The court dealt with this assertion directly by stating, "[ijn our opinion no such differentiation was actually
intended or even implied." 69 While the court might well have stopped at this
point, it went further, presumably in an effort to avoid the constitutional
question through statutory construction and by resorting to analogous decisional principles.
Agreeing with the petitioner that the Executive Order "had in mind section
23(a)(1)(A)," the court noted that that section permitted a "reasonable allow67. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 247, tit. II, §211(a), 53 Stat. 867 (1939)
§162(a)).
68. 16 T.C. at 1318.
69. Id.
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ance" for compensation for services.70 The court then proceeded to interpret
the Act and Executive Order as declaring that, as a matter of law, salaries paid
in contravention thereof shall not constitute reasonable compensation under
section 23(a)(1)(A). Next, the court announced the rule, not seen before in tax
decisions, that all claims of deductions for compensation paid, whether they
constitute business expenses or direct labor charged to cost of goods sold, may
be reviewed by the court to determine whether the amount paid is reasonable.
The court concluded its puzzling sequence by declaring that the unlawful
wage payment in question was "not deductible as a business expense because
it did not constitute reasonable compensation." 71
The court thus engaged in doctrinal distortion by applying a statutory
principle applicable to deductions, that the courts must scrutinize a compensation allowance for reasonableness, to compensation claimed as part of cost of
goods sold.72 Then the court engrafted upon that principle a legal fiction: compensation which is illegal is, as a matter of law, "unreasonable" compensation.
Having thus identified the "illegal" wages in question as "unreasonable," the
court concluded that they were not allowable.
In summary, the court subjected the claimed allowance for wages to the
conditions set forth in section 23(a)(1)(A) because they constituted compensation (thus refusing to recognize their separate status as pre-gross income adjustments), found them unreasonable because they were illegal, and concluded
that being unreasonable in amount, they were not allowable. Having thus
fashioned the rule that direct labor wages are subject to the same tests prescribed for compensation deductions under section 28(a)(1)(A), the court swept
aside the petitioner's argument by assuming that the argument suggested,
which it did not, that the courts may not scrutinize pre-gross income adjustments to determine whether they are properly characterized as compensation.7
and substantiated as to amount.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See text accompanying notes 74-75 infra.
73. The Weather-Seal court, in support of its reasoning, relied upon two decisions which
had allowed an adjustment to cost of goods sold. In the 1940 case of Majestic Securities Corp.,
42 B.T.A. 698 (1940), aff'd, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941), the court scrutinized the amount paid
by the petitioner, a price well in excess of market value, for certain securities from a bank
controlled by shareholders of petitioner. In the later sale of the securities petitioner claimed
a loss. Finding that the excess amount of purchase price was paid for a purpose other than
acquisition of the securities, and that the interests of purchaser and seller were not adverse
(and not arm's length), the court adjusted petitioner's cost basis for the securities to the prevailing market price at the time of acquisition. The Weather-Seal court also relied upon a
1951 Fifth Circuit opinion, American Pitch Export Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 721 (5th
Cir. 1951), in which an actual inventory available after the close of the taxable year and prior
to filing the return was required to be used in place of an estimated inventory. The latter had
the effect of increasing the cost of goods sold and reducing taxable income from sales. The
Weather-Seal court relied upon these cases as its authority for applying a reasonableness test
to wages. Both decisions are readily distinguishable from Weather-Seal. In Majestic Securities,
the court made a factual inquiry into the purchase price of the securities and found it to be
in excess of market price. Further, the court made thefactual determination that the amount
paid for the securities was for purposes other than purchase. In American Pitch Pine, the
estimated inventory, which was determined to be inaccurate, was replaced by an actual in-
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Though the Weather-Seal decision might have reached a just and desirable
result, it is doctrinally incorrect and is not supported by previous case law,
including the two decisions cited in the opinion.7 4 The courts have always been
authorized to examine payments for which tax benefits are claimed to determine the amount of the payment, if and when it was paid, and to whom. Moreover, the courts may examine the nature of the payment, and the relevant facts
and circumstances, to determine its true nature. It should not be suggested, and
indeed it was not argued by the taxpayer in Weather-Seal, that payments constituting pre-gross income adjustments are immune from such scrutiny. However, Weather-Seal would establish an entirely different principle: that all
compensation whether constituting direct cost labor reflected as a pre-gross
income adjustment, or "overhead" labor deductible from gross income, is subject to the "reasonableness" requirement of section 23(a)(1)(A) of the 1939 Code
and section 162(a) of the 1954 Code.
This view is incorrect. Since business deductions under section 162 are
matters of legislative grace, Congress is authorized, and has elected, to condition deductions for wage payments on their reasonableness in amount, a test
which requires a comparison of the wages in question with those paid by others
in similar industries and circumstances. However, Congress has not legislated
any such condition to the allowance of wages which are accounted for in the
computation of gross income. Thus, while the reasonableness of direct cost
compensation may be admissible as evidence of the compensatory nature of a
given payment, it does not constitute, of itself, a basis for disallowance of the
payment. In reaching its result in Weather-Seal, however, the Tax Court held
otherwise. 75
Weather-Seal and Pedone v. United States76 should be and generally have
been given little credence as authority beyond their own peculiar facts and
circumstances. 77 There can be no doubt that the mechanism adopted by the
ventory count. The court determined that the taxpayer used an estimated inventory when an
actual count was available. These factual determinations were far different from the determination made by the Weather-Seal court that, as a matter of law, the wages in question
were unreasonable and therefore not allowable.
74. See note 73 supra.
75. Weather-Seal has been cited in one case (outside of the area of price control legislation) as authority for the principle that direct labor wages may be disallowed to the extent
they are unreasonable in amount. In R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 21,841
(1956), aff'd, 260 F.2d 9 (4th Cir. 1958), the Tax Court had occasion to examine and reaffirm
Weather-Seal and found it applicable in that case. There excessive compensation was paid to
employees in petitioner's buying and manufacturing operations as well as to employees of an
unrelated corporation. The court, quoting extensively from Weather-Seal, found that the
payments were in the essence of compensation for personal services rendered, whether considered as a §162 deduction or as a labor cost, and "might be disallowed as a deduction in
computing taxable net income to the extent that they were unreasonable in amount." Id.,
21,841 at 846.
76. 151 F. Supp. 288 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 829 (1957).
77. Weather-Seal has been cited in a limited number of decisions as authority for the
proposition that pre-gross income adjustments are subject to the same tests as deductions
under §162. In Sidney Zehman, 27 T.C. 876 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 424 (1958), a
case arising under the Defense Production Act of 1950, direct labor costs in excess of wage
ceilings were paid by a partnership. Despite arguments by petitioners that the wage law was
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court in Weather-Seal, if not limited to the circumstances surrounding that
decision, could seriously erode the concept of gross income as the barrier beyond which Congress cannot go in levying income taxes. In the author's view,
that mechanism will continue to be so limited. In practice, the Tax Court has
assigned Weather-Seal an extremely narrow scope and has shown no inclination
to view it as general authority for interjecting public policy considerations into
the area of pre-gross income adjustments.78
The court's own view of the narrow scope of Weather-Seal is demonstrated
in the opinion by the manner in which the court distinguished Sullenger. The
primary basis for that distinction was that "no authority was found [in
Sullenger] to deny the taxpayer the use of its actual cost despite the fact that
the portion thereof in controversy was paid in contravention of the O.P.A.
price." 79 This indication that Weather-Seal was intended to be restricted as
precedent to its peculiar circumstances, that is, a statute and executive order
dearly establishing disallowance as a sanction for violating federal price regulations, represented no new thinking on the part of the Tax Court. Three years
earlier in Sullenger, the Commissioner had suggested another convenient ficeither inapplicable or unconstitutional, the Tax Court, deferring to the Weather-Seal decision, subjected the wages to a reasonableness test, holding that the wages were business expenses under §23(a)(1)(A) and deductible if reasonable in amount. To the same effect, see
Solon Decorating Co., 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 122,273 (1957), aff'd per curiam, 253 F.2d 424 (6th
Cir. 1958), Harold Binder, 12 T.C.M. (CCH) 19,692 (1953). Weather-Seal was relied upon as
authority in four other decisions, not involving the Defense Production Act. In G.E. Fuller,
20 T.C. 308 (1953), petitioner attempted to include confiscated whiskey in his cost of goods
sold, thus decreasing his taxable income. The Tax Court, refusing to allow as part of cost of
goods sold items which were not available for sale or actually sold by petitioner by reason
of confiscation, cited Weather-Seal as general authority for this proposition.
In Estate of Edwin H. Johnson, 42 T.C. 441 (1964), aff'd, 355 F.2d 931 (6th Cir. 1965), the
taxpayer argued that §267(a) was not applicable to disallow losses between related taxpayers
because the difference between the cost and the amount realized represented cost of goods
sold. Petitioners claimed that the disallowed amounts were not deductions within the meaning
of §267(a)(1) but rather were a part of cost of goods sold, and that to tax the latter was unconstitutional. The court, citing Weather-Seal and noting that the effect of applying §267(a)(1)
was not to tax gross receipts, but only to keep petitioners from reducing other income by that
loss, held that §267(a)(1) applied to disallow the loss.
In National Biscuit Co., 29 T.C. 409 (1957), the Commissioner argued that vacation pay
of hourly workers, which was part of cost of goods sold, was not a deduction within the
meaning of §23, the predecessor to §162, and therefore not a deduction for purpose of the
Korean War Excess Profits Tax. The Tax Court, using the Commissioner's position in
Weather-Seal against him, held that vacation pay constituted a deduction for purposes of the
Excess Profits Tax. Commenting that compensation, in determining gross income, is not
relieved of the conditions of (1) "ordinary and necessary," (2) reasonableness, and (3) "for
personal services actually rendered," which conditions were expressly stated in §23, the court
found that compensation is, by definition, within the meaning of "deduction" as used in §23,
even though properly included in cost of goods sold.
In Reynolds Tobacco, discussed in note 57 supra, the Tax Court reaffirmed and applied
Weather-Seal, finding that "direct cost" wages paid to employees, constituting a part of cost of
goods sold, could be disallowed to the extent they were unreasonable in amount. The case
was decided in a memorandum opinion, and appealed to the Fourth Circuit by the Commissioner on other issues. The ruling here discussed was not considered on appeal.
78. See cases relying on Weather-Seal cited in note 77 supra.
79. 16 T.C. at 1320.
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tion to the Tax Court as a basis for a decision adverse to the taxpayer. There
the court was urged that to view the over-ceiling portion of the purchase price
as a "bribe" to induce the seller to sell goods to the petitioner at the O.P.A.
ceiling price.80 Had the Tax Court accepted this idea, the "bribe" would have
been reclassified from cost of goods sold to a deduction subject to disallowance
on public policy grounds. But the Sullenger court refused to fragment the purchase price on the basis of a convenient fiction, noting that "the Commissioner
has always recognized, as indeed he must to stay within the Constitution, that
the cost of goods sold must be deducted from gross receipts in order to arrive at
gross income ....

"81

Had the Tax Court intended Weather-Seal as general authority for extending the public policy doctrine into the area of pre-gross income adjustments, it had an excellent opportunity to do so in the milk rebate cases, 2 the
first of which came before the court five years after Weather-Seal was decided.
However, as will be discussed, the Court showed no such inclination.
Decisions Under State PriceRegulation Laws
While the federal anti-inflation laws discussed above feature price ceilings
designed to curb wage-price spirals, state price regulations producing tax controversies prior to 1969 were more typically concerned wth maintaining price
floors, usually to maintain stable markets for in-state industries. Thus, where
state pricing laws were violated in a transaction, it was typically the seller of
goods and not the buyer whose disregard of the law eventually led to conflict
with the Commissioner. While the O.P.A. cases reveal a purchaser seeking tax
benefit for amounts illegally paid, the state pricing law cases typically involve
the seller seeking to recover illegal rebates and discount payments as an offset
to gross sales.
In Polley v. Westover,83 a refund suit before a United States district court
in California, the taxpayers were partners in a wholesale liquor business. Competition among wholesale liquor dealers was intense, and there existed throughout the industry a trade custom of offering cash rebates against the invoice
price of liquor for quantity purchases. A rule issued by the state liquor authorities regulated such discounts, 8 4 but the competitive atmosphere led to almost
universal violation of the regulation. The State Board enforced the rule "only
sporadically," but on one occasion applied it to the taxpayers, imposing a three80. 11 T.C. at 1077.
81.

Id.

82. See text accompanying notes 83-115 infra. It should be noted that, stated in the
reverse, the fictional "bribe" argument advanced by the Commissioner in Sullenger is also
equally applicable, in theory, in rebate cases. Moreover, precedents existed for applying the
Weather-Seal "reasonableness" theory, with at least no greater misapplication of logic and
doctrine, to cases involving the purchase of goods. See Majestic Securities Corp. v. Commis.
sioner, 42 B.TA. 698 (1940), afJ'd, 120 F.2d 12 (8th Cir. 1941).
83. 77 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
84. In September, 1939, the State Board of Equalization adopted a rule which provided
certain restrictions on discounts, including a provision that "quantity discounts may be based
on sales and deliveries to one purchaser with twenty-four (24) hours only." Id. at 975.
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day license suspension.85 The rule itself was suspended five years after its
adoption. The applicable statute provided only that no wholesaler shall "give
secret rebates or make any secret concessions" to a retail dealer.8 6 The district
court found that the trade custom as to discounts which was followed by the
taxpayers was a matter of common knowledge in the trade and was known to
the State Board.
During 1941, customers of the taxpayers received $17,532.26 as discounts
for quantity purchases. In their partnership return, the taxpayers deducted such
discounts as sales expenses. The Commissioner disallowed such deductions on
the ground that they were not allowable under section 23(a) of the 1939 Code.
The district court did not consider in its conclusions of law whether the
discounts in question were adjustments to gross sales, deductible in arriving at
gross income, or business expenses to be deducted from gross income in arriving
at taxable income. There is no indication that the taxpayers advanced the
former as alternative grounds for allowance of the deduction. Instead, the
litigants and the court appear to have addressed themselves to the specific
grounds for disallowance raised by the Commissioner based upon a claim for
deduction in the taxpayers' return, and they threfore proceeded to test the
claim for deduction against the public policy doctrine. Applying the public
policy criteria and citing Commissioner v. Heininger, 7 the court concluded
that the allowance of an income tax deduction for such payments would not
frustrate any well-defined national or state policy.88 Then, almost as if by
afterthought, the court found that:
Failure to allow this deduction would result in taxing the plaintiffs on
amounts which they did not receive, and which, by agreement, they were
not entitled to receive, because they agreed in advance with the retail
dealers to reduce the purchase price of liquor by the amount of the cash
payments.8 9
As later recognized by the Tax Court, the district court in Polley did not
consider whether the discounts in question were "deductions to arrive at gross
income," or "deductions from gross income."' 0 Any distinction between the two
classifications was made moot in that case by the court's approval of the deductions. Nevertheless, the district court did conclude that the practical effect of a
contrary holding would have been the creation of income where, in fact, none
had been received or claimed by the taxpayers.9 1 This conclusion, though it
appeared to have been overshadowed in the opinion by the public policy issue,
has been given primary emphasis by the courts considering the same question
in later cases.9 2 Moreover, there is no indication in the opinion as to how the
85. Id.

86. Id. at 974.
87. 320 US. 467 (1943).
88. 77 F. Supp. at 976.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Txi-State Beverage Distrib., Inc., 27 T.C. 1026, 1030 (1957).
77 F. Supp. at 976.
See text accompanying notes 94-98 infra.
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district court would have disposed of Polley had it found the discounts in
question to be in violation of sharply defined state policy. In that event, the
court would have found its conclusions under section 23(a) of the 1939 Code to
be in conflict with its other conclusion that a denial of the deduction would
have the effect of creating income which the taxpayer never received or claimed
a right to receive. Only then would the court have been forced to consider
whether the public policy test could be applied to adjustments to gross sales in
calculating gross income.
The next case involving whether the public purpose policy may be applied
to determine allowability of pre-gross income adjustments was PittsburghMilk
Co.93 The company, a milk dealer licensed under the Milk Control Law of
Pennsylvania, gave rebates to customers in willful violation of the Pennsylvania
Milk Control Law and minimum price orders of the Milk Control Commission.
Such rebates were paid pursuant to informal agreements between the company
and some, though not all, of its clients. Those agreements were intended to
violate the state law by effecting net prices for milk at rates below the minimum
prices prescribed by law. The company went to elaborate lengths to conceal
the rebate agreements as well as the actual payment of the rebates from the
state authorities; rebate agreements were informal; the customers were billed,
and they remitted to the taxpayer the full price required by state law; and the
company used third parties as conduits for passing the rebate payments to its
customers. The Commissioner disallowed the deductions, presenting the Tax
Court with the question of what tax effect, if any, should be given to the rebates which the corporation had made in willful violation of the state milk
control law.
The taxpayer argued that the rebates should be treated as allowances in
reduction of the corporation's gross sales, on the theory that the milk was
actually sold for agreed net prices, and in the alternative, that such allowances
should be recognized as deductions from gross income, for ordinary and necessary business expenses in the nature of advertising or sales promotion expenses.
The Commissioner countered that the milk was sold for the list prices fixed by
the Milk Control Commission since those were the prices used in entering the
sales on the corporation's books. He further contended that the allowances
could not be recognized in computing tax liability unless they met the qualifications prescribed in section 23(a) of the 1939 Code for deductions from gross
income. He argued that they could not so qualify under the circumstances since
the allowance of such deductions would frustrate the sharply-defined policy of
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
Addressing the factually incorrect characterization of the rebates as "advertising expenses" in the company's books and income tax return, the court
restated the settled principle that when book entries do not accurately reflect
income, the actual facts will govern in determining the taxability of a transaction. 94 The court found that the corporation sold milk to its customers at net
prices previously agreed upon which were determined by reducing the pre93.
94.

26 T.C. 707 (1956).
Id. at 715.
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scribed list prices of the Milk Control Commission by the agreed rates of allowance. 95 On that finding, the court concluded:
We are here dealing with the taxation of income. Under both the
Sixteenth Amendment and the Internal Revenue Code, the tax is imposed only on "income," and not upon every conceivable type of receipt.
Where gains, profits, and income derived from the sale of property are
involved, the tax is computed with respect to "the amount realized therefrom" (citation omitted), and such realized amount must be based on the
actual price or consideration for which the property was sold, and not on
some greater price for which it possibly should have been, but was not,
sold. 96
Citing its decision in Sullenger,9 7 the court stated: "no more than the actual
gross income can be subjected to income tax, in any amount."98
As to the fact that the petitioner's customers had remitted the full invoice
price including the previously agreed, but illegal, discount, the court found
this to be of no consequence since the taxpayer did not acquire the excess discount beneficially or under any claim of right, but received it merely as a
deposit which was to be returned in all events.99 Though the court made extensive findings of fact as to the public policy issue, it failed to reach that issue
due to its conclusion that the rebates in question were deductions from gross
sales in the computation of gross income.
The court admonished against an overly broad interpretation of the
opinion, warning that it would not stand as authority for treating all allowances, discounts and rebates made by a seller as adjustments of the selling price.
The facts and circumstances of the transaction and not the terminology employed would govern future cases, the critical inquiries being the intent of the
parties and the purpose or consideration for which the allowance was made.100
In two subsequent cases, the Commissioner attempted both to distinguish
Pittsburgh Milk and to convince the Tax Court to overrule it. In Rosedale
Dairy Co., 10 ' decided in 1957, the issue again involved customer rebates paid
by a milk dealer in willful violation of state minimum price laws. On facts so
similar to those in PittsburghMilk that the Commissioner did not attempt to
distinguish the two cases, Tax Court Judge Rice held that the amount of the
rebates which the company received and subsequently refunded to its customers
"did not constitute income to it when originally received and should not have
been included by it in computing and reporting its gross income."102 With a
sense of irony, the Judge cited as authority for his holding the Tax Court's
decision in Tri-State Beverage Distributors,Inc.,1 0 3 a case in which the Com95. Id.
96.

Id.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

11 T.C. 1076 (1948). See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
26 T.C. at 715.
Id. at 716.
Id. at 716-17.
16 T.C.M. (CCH) 22,793 (1957).

102. Id., 22,793 at 1123.
103. 27 T.C. 1026 (1957).
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missioner had successfully argued that identical rebates constituted adjustments of the sales price, and not deductions from gross income.
In Harmony Dairy Co.,104 decided in 1960, the Tax Court was again confronted with a dispute involving the same Pennsylvania Milk Control law
which had been dealt with in Pittsburgh Milk. Like the Pittsburgh Milk Company, the taxpayer, a corporation licensed under the Act as a milk dealer,
entered into informal understandings with certain customers pursuant to
which the customers paid the invoiced legal "list" prices but received rebates
in previously agreed-upon amounts from the company. Also like Pittsburgh
Milk Company, the corporation used a third party conduit to cover its illegal
acts and employed deceptive bookkeeping practices to account for the rebates.
Unlike Pittsburgh Milk Company, which acknowledged the illegality of its
rebate payments, Harmony Dairy denied that its rebate practices violated
Pennsylvania law. 10 5
The Commissioner urged that the circumstances of this case should distinguish it from PittsburghMilk, not only because Harmony Dairy had denied
the illegality of its rebates but also because it had not established in the record
that the rebates were made pursuant to informal agreements with the customers. 00
The court swept aside as insignificant the question of whether Harmony's
rebates actually violated state law citing the Supreme Court's oft-quoted remark
from Commissioner v. Wilcox: "[M]oral turpitude is not a touchstone of taxability."'1

7

As to the Commissioner's insistence that Harmony had not proven

the prior agreements with its customers, the court disagreed, finding that the
rebates had been paid pursuant to prior understandings between Harmony
08
and its customers.
Again the Commissioner urged that Pittsburgh Milk had been incorrectly
decided and urged the court to overrule the decision. As in Rosedale Dairy, the
court reconfirmed its adherence to Pittsburgh Milk and held that the amounts
ultimately rebated to the customers did not constitute income to Harmony
when initially received by it and were properly used to reduce its gross sales in
determining gross profits for federal income tax purposes.109
Reflecting a determined commitment to have the Pittsburgh Milk doctrine
overruled or limited, the Commissioner brought two further cases to the Tax
Court involving the allowance of rebates made in violation of state milk price
control laws. Both cases involved violations of regulations and orders of the
New Jersey Office of Milk Industry (OMI).
In Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc.," 0 a New Jersey licensed milk dealer,
104. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 24,203 (1960).
105. As to that denial, however, the court found that Harmony's customers knew that the
"net" price, after deducting the agreed rebate, would be less than the minimum price provided by the Milk Control law. Id., f24,203 at 584.
106. Id., ff24,203 at 586.
107. 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
108. 19 T.C.M. (CCH) f24,203 at 587.
109. Id.
110. 36 T.C. 173 (1961).
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under pressure from competitors who engaged in similar practices, entered into
agreements with selected customers pursuant to which portions of the invoice
price of petitioner's milk products were rebated to those customers. The effect
of such rebates was to reduce petitioner's selling price of milk products below
the minimum price prescribed by the OMI. The facts of the case reveal only
slight variations from the PittsburghMilk fact pattern. Most of the customers
received cash rebates and signed a voucher therefor. 11 The usual amount of
deception occured in petitioner's bookkeeping practices, and, as in the other
milk rebate cases, the rebates were booked as "selling expenses-sales promotion." In its tax return, petitioner claimed deductions for the rebates as an
ordinary and necessary business expense, again classified as "selling expensessales promotion." The deduction of the rebates as so classified was disallowed
by the Commissioner. Nevertheless, Judge Raum stated in his opinion that the
issue in the case was not whether such discounts were ordinary and necessary
business expenses deductible from gross income in arriving at net income, but
whether the net discounts should have been included in petitioner's gross income in the first instance. Rejecting the Commissioner's urging that Pittsburgh
Milk be overruled, Judge Raum cited the Rosedale and Harmony decisions as
confirming PittsburghMilk and announced that the court was not disposed to
reopen the issue. 112 Judge Raum also pointed to the Commissioner's inconsistent position taken in Tri-State Beverage Distributors,Inc. s
Bloomingdale Dairy Co., Inc.,114 decided in a memorandum opinidn filed
simultaneously with the opinion in Atzingen-Whitehouse, raised no substantial
variation in the fact pattern from the milk rebate cases which preceded it. The
record at trial reflected cash rebates paid to petitioner's customers which had
the effect of lowering the price of petitioner's milk products below the minimum prices set by the New Jersey OMI. It was a consistent practice of the
petitioner to pay the cash rebates to the customers at the same time that the
customers paid petitioner the full invoiced legal price. The petitioner sought
a tax allowance for its rebate payments by including such amounts in cost of
goods sold in the computation of gross income. Concluding that the only
question for decision was identical with the rebate issue decided that same day
in Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., Judge Raum held for the petitioner in a
six-line opinion.15
Prior to 1967, the cases involving application of the public policy doctrine
to pre-gross income adjustments involved customer rebates and discounts made
by businesses engaged in selling products. In Allen Schiffman,116 however, the
Tax Court considered whether illegal rebates and discounts of insurance
premiums by an insurance broker to his customers were excludable from the
111. Some customers, presumably out of concern for state prosecution, refused to sign
receipts, which produced a substantiation issue in the case that was resolved by the court in

the taxpayer's favor. id. at 181-82.
112. Id.at 181.
113. 27 T.C. 1026 (1956).
114. 20 T.C.M. (CCEI) 124,803 (1961).

115. Id.
116. 47 T.C. 557 (1967).
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broker's gross income or constituted deductions from gross income. The insurance broker contended that such rebates and discounts were adjustments to
the purchase price of the insurance (that is, the premium), and thus were excludable from the broker's gross income under the Pittsburgh Milk Co. and
Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy decisions. The Commissioner sought to distinguish
those cases on the ground that the rebates and discounts there in issue were
adjustments agreed to between buyer and seller, whereas in Schiffman the
insurance company, though a principal in the transaction, was not a party to
the adjustment.
The court refused to distinguish the milk rebate cases on these grounds;
rather, it applied the claim of right doctrine as the basis of its decision:
[W]e think that the fundamental consideration is whether the customer
paid or was required to pay such amounts to petitioner, so that it could
be said that he received them under a claim of right or turned his back
on income to which he was otherwise entitled. It cannot be gainsaid that
the arrangements were made by petitioner prior to his sales of insurance.
At the moment of sale and billing, his customer was not required to pay
and petitioner had no claim to the amount of the discount (which he
never received) or the
rebate (which he received but was immediately
117
required to refund).
18
The court also distinguished United Draperies,Inc.and Boyle, Flagg &
Seaman, Inc.,119 two cases involving kickbacks to employees of the purchaser,
noting that those cases involved situations where the petitioner's agreement to
pay rebates to the employees was "independent of its agreement with its purchasers fixing the selling price of the products sold."120 The amounts paid in
those cases were paid for a consideration separate from the selling price of the
seller's products.
Thus, although recognizing that its holding "may offer a safe haven for
violators of State laws,"1 21 the court held that the rebates and discounts in
Schiffman were adjustments to the selling price of the insurance, and thus were
not includable in the broker's gross income.

Analysis of the Pre-1969 Cases
The holdings in Pittsburgh Milk, Rosedale, Harmony, Atzingen-Whitehouse, and Bloomingdale not only are consistent with each other, but also are
consistent with other cases based on pre-1969 law not involving considerations
of the public policy doctrine.
The rebates in the milk cases are analogous to trade discounts which are
available to customers at the moment of invoicing and which are not contingent upon future acts of the customer, such as early payment of the invoice,
117.
118.

Id. at 541.
41 T.C. 457 (1964), aff'd, 340 F.2d 936 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 813

(1965).
119. 25 T.C. 43 (1955).
120.
121.

47 T.C. at 542.
Id.
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or the future purchase of specified quantities of merchandise. 122 Such trade
discounts have consistently been held to be properly deducted from gross sales
in arriving at gross income.1 23 Reminiscent of the court's admonition in Pittsburgh Milk that mere terminology does not control, the Board of Tax Appeals
held in American Lace Manufacturing Co. 1 24 that a seven percent discount
offered by the petitioner to its customers for payment within ten days was
actually a trade discount, properly deducted from gross sales. In that case the
facts showed that the customers consistently claimed the discounts without
objection by the petitioner and without regard to the time of payment. Under
those facts, the Board found that the so-called cash discount should be treated

for tax purposes as a trade discount.
Unlike the trade discount, the true cash discount is contingent upon acts of
the taxpayer's customer subsequent to the issuance of the invoice: for example,
the payment of the account receivable on or before a stipulated date. For that
reason, the courts have consistently refused to allow taxpayers to deduct reserves representing taxpayers' estimates of cash discounts to be taken in the
subsequent year. 125 The same result is seen in cases involving merchandise
return allowances. 1 2 In both situations, the courts have based their decisions
on the fact that the taxpayer's liability for the refund or discount does not
arise until the occurrence of certain events in the subsequent year, that is, the
early payment of the account receivable or the return of merchandise.
The cash discount and return allowance cases reflect an adherence to general principles of tax accounting and to principles related to maintaining the
integrity of the taxable year as the period for calculating tax liability.UT They
do not, however, in any way ignore or undermine the fundamental distinctions
between deductions from gross income and pre-gross income adjustments.
In at least one case which was decided during the period of the milk rebate
decisions, the distinctions between pre-gross income adjustments and deductions from gross income were advanced by the Commissioner and accepted by
the Tax Court as the basis for decisions in his favor. Tri-State Beverage Distributors,Inc.,128 a corporate excess profits case under the 1939 Code, involved
facts strikingly similar to those in Pittsburgh Milk, though it dealt with differ122. For a discussion of trade discounts and how they are distinguished from cash dis.

counts, see e.g., San Diego Transit-Mixed Concrete Co., 21 T.C.M. (CCII) 1125,534 at 750
(1962); Albert C.Becken, Jr., 5 T.C. 498, 505 (1945); American Cigar Co., 21 B.T.A. 464, 499
(1930); and American Lace Mfg. Co., 8 B.T.A. 419, 420 (1927).

123. See cases cited in note 122 supra. See also William H. Kenner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH)
ff32,816 (1974), and Allen Schiffman, 47 T.C. 537, 541 (1967).
124. 8 B.T.A. 419 (1927). Cf. Stein-Bloch Co., 23 B.T.A. 1162 (1931) (discounts were

contingent upon time of payment and thus could not be treated as trade discounts).
125. E.g., Shapleigh Hardware Co. v. United States, 81 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1936); Farmville Oil & Fertilizer Co. v. Commissioner, 78 F.2d 83 (4th Cir. 1935); Leonard v. United
States, 7 F. Supp. 295 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Miami Valley Coated Paper Co., 28 T.C. 492 (1957);
Albert C. Becken, Jr., 5 T.C. 498 (1945); Stein.Bloch Co., 23 B.T.A. 1162 (1931); American
Cigar Co., 21 B.T.A. 464 (1930), aff'd on other grounds, 66 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1933); Ederheimer-Stein Co., 2 B.T.A. 711 (1925); M.I. Steward &Co., 2 B.T.A. 737 (1925).
126. Ertegun v. Commissioner, 531 F.2d 1156, 1161 (2d Cir. 1976).
127. Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
128. 27 T.C. 1026 (1957).
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ent legal issues. The petitioner, an Illinois wholesale liquor dealer, was forced
by intense price competition to give price discounts to its customers. 129 The
court suggested, but did not expressly find due to an unclear record, that either
"the distillers or a fair trade law required the petitioner to sell liquor at the
list price."' 130 The discounts were not dependent in any way upon promptness
of payment or quantity of merchandise purchased. The petitioner sought to
have the price discounts eliminated from the computation of his excess profits
net income for the base period years, under a statutory provision permitting the
exclusion of amounts representing "abnormal deductions."' 31 The term "abnormal deductions," appearing in section 711(b)(1)(J) of the 1939 Code, re32
ferred to statutory deductions or deductions allowable under section 23(a).2
The petitioner argued that the discounts in question constituted deductions
from gross income under section 23(a), predecessor to section 162(a), and relied
on the district court decision in Polley v. Westover.133 The Commissioner, on
the other hand, argued that the discounts were not deductions from gross income but adjustments to the sales price in calculating gross income and thus
were not to be included in a calculation of "abnormal deductions."
The Tax Court, though acknowledging that the rebates in the Polley case
had been tested by that court under section 23(a), considered that case inapposite since the court had not actually decided whether the discounts in
question constituted deductions from gross income or deductions to arrive at
gross income. 3 4
In support of his contention that the discounts in question were pre-gross
income adjustments and not deductions under section 23(a), the Commissioner
urged the Pittsburgh Milk Co. decision as precedent. Deciding for the Commissioner, the court concluded "the discounts involved herein... are essentially
of the same nature as those involved in Pittsburgh Milk Co.... Accordingly,
we hold that the discounts involved herein are deductions to arrive at gross
income. They are not deductions from gross income or deductions within the
meaning of section 711 (b)(l)(J)."'18
In the more recent case of B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc.,"s6 the distinction between
a deduction and a pre-gross income adjustment was again pivotal, this time in
the context of an issue involving the application of sections 1311-1314 of the
129. The price discounts, which petitioner allowed to its customers in amounts up to
about 10% of the list price, varied from time to time and between customers, but the per.
centage was always known to the customer at the time of sale. Id. at 1028.
130. Id.
131. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 10, §3, 55 Stat. 18 (1941).
132. Colorado Milling & Elevator Co., 17 T.C. 1280, 1285 (1952), appeal dismissed, 205
F.2d 551 (10th Cir. 1953); Crow-Burlingane Co., 15 T.C. 738, 752 (1950), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 192 F.2d 574 (8th Cir. 1951); Universal Optical Co., 11 T.C. 608, 621 (1948).
133. See text accompanying notes 83-92 supra.
134. 27 T.C. at 1030. See text accompanying notes 90-92 supra. Since the court, in Polley,
found the deductions allowable under §23(a), the same result would have been obtained in
that case from the court's finding that the discounts there in question constituted adjustments
to gross sales.
135. 27 T.C. at 1031.
136. 65 T.C. 422 (1975), afl'd, 584 F.2d 53 (5th Cir. 1978).
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1954 Code to an otherwise barred taxable year. From 1958 to 1965, an employee
of the petitioner fruit dealer had engaged in a continuous scheme of embezzling
of petitioner's funds by causing petitioner's checks to be written to a fictitious
payee and then intercepting the funds. The employee had characterized the
fictitious payee as a seller of fruit to the petitioner, and, as a consequence, the
petitioner innocently included the embezzled amounts in its tax returns for the
years 1958 to 1965 as part of cost of goods sold.
When the petitioner discovered the embezzlement in 1965, it claimed the
entire amount embezzled as a theft loss deductible under section 165. In a
notice of deficiency issued in 1965, the Commissioner disallowed that part of
the embezzlement deduction attributable to embezzlements during the years
1958 to 1961 as being barred by the statute of limitations. Litigation ensued
and the Tax Court determined that the embezzlement deduction was allowable
in its entirety as a deduction in 1965.137
Following the decision of the Tax Court, the Commissioner served another
statutory notice upon the petitioner invoking sections 1311-1314 and seeking,
in effect, an adjustment which would disallow the inclusion of the embezzlement amounts in cost of goods sold during the otherwise barred years. In the
tortuous course of tracking through these code sections, the court arrived at the
pivotal question of whether the circumstances of the adjustment came within
the meaning of section 1312(2). The court concluded that although the previous Tax Court decision had allowed a deduction for petitioner's 1965 taxable
year, it was not a deduction "which was erroneously allowed to the taxpayer
for another taxable year" within the meaning of the statute.1 38
In a lengthy opinion, the court delineated a "crucial distinction" between
basis and cost of goods sold on one hand, and deductible expenses on the other
hand.239 Observing that the mitigating provisions of sections 1311-1314 were
drafted by Congress with great precision, the court noted that the term "deduction," which appears several times in section 1312, is never used in connection with errors relating to gross income, such errors being associated instead
with the terms "inclusion," "exclusion," and "omission." Thus, the court conduded that Congress intended to use the term "deduction" in section 1312 as a
term of art including only deductions from gross income in arriving at taxable
income. 4 o
In summary, the decisions reveal a clear recognition by the courts of the
nature of pre-gross income adjustments and of the fundamental distinctions
between such adjustments and statutory deductions from gross income. Giving
appropriate effect to those distinctions has, on some occasions, led courts to
results which they would have dearly preferred to avoid. The Cook case gives
an illustration of this where the end result gave the taxpayer a double tax
benefit for funds lost by embezzlement.
137. B.C. Cook &Sons, Inc., 59 T.C. 516 (1972).
188. 65 T.C. at 428. Section 1312(2) authorizes the adjustment sought by the Commissioner
if the effect of the previous Tax Court decision had been to allow "a deduction or credit
which was erroneously allowed to the taxpayer for another taxable year." I.R.C. §1312(2).
139. 65 T.C. at 428.
140. Id. at 480.
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Unquestionably, cases involving illegal purchases and payments have provided the courts with their greatest temptation to ignore the distinctions between deductions and pre-gross income adjustments. In nearly all decisions in
which the courts have rejected the Commissioner's arguments for disallowing
pre-gross income adjustments on grounds of public policy, the majority opinions have carefully disclaimed any condonation of the illegal acts in question.
Nevertheless, with the sole exception of the nearly unique situation dealt with
by the Tax Court in Weather-Seal and the Court of Claims in Pedone, the
courts have consistently recognized in cases arising under pre-1969 law that
pre-gross income adjustments are not subject to disallowance on grounds of
public policy, even though the result is an "assymmetrical treatment of above
1 41
and below the line illegality.'
LEGISLATIVE PREEMPTION OF THE PUBLIC PoLIcY DoCTRINE

In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,142 Congress enacted sections 162(c), (f), and
(g) of the Internal Revenue Code as its own expression of the public policy
doctrine and thus preempted an area of the law which, until then, had been
delineated almost entirely by decisions of the courts. 143 The legislation, which
had its beginnings in a 1965 study by the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation,144 included provisions limiting the deduction of bribes and kickbacks, fines and penalties, and treble damage payments under the antitrust laws.
It seems clear that Congress intended the 1969 legislation to replace the
entire existing body of decisional law relating to the disallowance of deductions on grounds of public policy. The Senate Finance Committee stated, "the
provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations which
are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive. Public policy,
in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the
45
disallowance of deductions.'
With such a clear expression in the Senate Report that the 1969 legislation
was intended to supercede all of the existing decisional law involving disallowance of deductions on grounds of public policy, one wonders why Congress failed to incorporate language to that effect in the statute itself. Only
future decisions will tell whether the courts will fully implement Congress'
uncodified intention that the prior decisional doctrine be completely dis1 48
mantled.
141. James Alex, 70 T.C. 322, 332 (1978).
142. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. 91-172, tit. IX, §902, 83 Stat. 648 (1969), 1969-3
C.B. 147 (codified at I.R.C. §§162(c), (f), (g)).
143. Exceptions to this were in the areas of gambling losses and government bribes.
I.R.C. §165(d), which limits the deduction of losses from wagering transactions only to the
extent of gains from those transactions, was originally enacted in 1934. See also wage and
price control legislation enacted during World War II and the Korean War, e.g., Stabilization
Act of 1942, ch. 578, §5(a), 56 Stat. 767 (1942); Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, tit.
IV, §405, 64 Stat. 807 (1950).
144. Staff Study of Income Tax Treatment of Treble Damage Payments Under the Antitrust Laws for the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation (Nov. 1965).
9
145. S. REP. No. 91-552, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597.
146. Some courts have interpreted the public policy doctrine as establishing a test for
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There is certainly no indication, either in the 1969 Act itself or in the
committee reports, that Congress intended to overrule the earlier decisions
which had precluded the disallowance of pre-gross income adjustments on
public policy grounds. All three subsections added to section 162 by the Tax
Reform Act of 1969 incorporate as their key operative dame the language, "no
deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) .. . .,147 No other code section
was amended by the public policy legislation contained in the Act. Thus, the
Act itself specifies that its limiting public policy provisions operate only upon
"deductions." Supplementing that unambigous expression of intent, the Senate
Finance Committee explained the problem necessitating the legislation in the
following manner:
At the present time there is not [sic] statutory provision setting forth a
general "public policy" basis for denying deductions which are "ordinary
and necessary" business deductions. Nevertheless, a number of business
these
expenses have been disallowed on the ground that the allowance of
148
deductions would be contrary to Federal or State "public policy."'
The foregoing seems dearly to confirm that Congress had no thought of
extending the operation of its 1969 public policy provisions to pre-gross income adjustments. Had it so intended, there is ample evidence elsewhere in
the Code that Congress knew and had previously used appropriate language to
implement such a purpose. 49 Moreover, it is proper to assume that Congress
was familiar with the body of decisional law which draws fundamental distinctions with constitutional overtones 5 0 between deductions and pre-gross
income adjustments, including several opinions in which the court expressly
51
attributes to Congress an awareness of such distinctions.' Last, and perhaps
most obvious, had Congress intended to enact limitations affecting the computation of gross income, it would not have chosen to codify such legislation
in section 162, a section of the Code historically dedicated to business deduc152
tions from gross income.
deductions entirely separate from the term "ordinary and necessary," e.g., Frederick Steel Co.,
42 T.C. 13 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, 375 F.2d 351 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 901

(1967). Others incorporate the public policy doctrine as a part of the interpretation of that
term, e.g., Textile Mills Sec. Corp. v. Commissioner, 314 U.S. 326, 339 (1941); Dixie Machine
Welding & Metal Works Inc. v. United States, 315 F.2d 439, 1963-1 U.S. Tax Cas. g9355 (5th
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 950 (1963); Joe Money Machinery Co. v. United States,
1961-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f9418 (N.D. Ala. 1961); Sarah Backer, I B.T.A. 214 (1924). The impact
of the 1969 legislation on those deductions will probably not be uniform in the future de-

cisions.
147. I.R.C. §§162(c), (f), (g).
148. S.REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), 1969-3 C.B. 423, 596.
149. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§1312, 1382(a), 6501(e)(1)(A)(i).

150. See text accompanying notes 43-62 supra.
151. See, e.g., Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948), discussed at text accompanying notes
34-35 supra, and B.C. Cook & Sons, Inc., 65 T.C. 422 (1975), discussed at text accompanying

notes 136-140 supra.
152. The Treasury seems to acknowledge this point, since in interpreting the 1969 legisla-

tion as affecting the computation of gross income, it amended its regulations under §61. See
TaaAs. Rxa. 1.61-3(a), T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163, and text accompanying notes 167-171 infra.
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In 1971, Congress again amended section 162(c) of the Code relating to
bribes and illegal kickbacks. 1 53 Congress broadened the heading of section
162(c) to read "Illegal Bribes, Kickbacks, and Other Payments," restated and
broadened the scope of the provision disallowing deductions for bribes and
kickbacks,15 4 and added a provision denying deductions for kickbacks, rebates,
bribes, and referral fees for goods or services, payment for which is to be made
under the Social Security Act or from federal funds approved under the Act. 5 5
Except for the latter section, the 1971 amendment was given retroactive effect
to the enactment date of the 1969 Act.
As for its purpose in amending the provision disallowing deductions for
bribes and kickbacks, the Senate Finance Committee explained:
Present law also provides that no tax deduction is to be allowed for pay.
ment of illegal bribes or kickbacks where, as a result of the payment,
there is successful criminal prosecution. If the bribe or kickback does not
constitute a criminal act (presumably even if there is a loss of license),
or if the taxpayer is not successfully prosecuted, the deduction is not disallowed under this provision.
The committee has become concerned that these provisions, enacted in
1969, may in some cases unduly restrict the denial of deductions. 156
Again, as in the 1969 Act, Congress failed to refer to pre-gross income adjustments in the legislation, or in the committee explanation. 157 Thus, though intending to broaden the scope of the provision dealing with kickbacks and
bribes, Congress clearly intended no extension of its application beyond the
area of statutory deductions. This view is further confirmed in the Senate
Finance Committee report: "The committee continues to believe that the
determination of when a deduction should be denied should remain under the
control of Congress. However, the committee has concluded that the area in
which deductions are denied should be expanded somewhat beyond the limits
set in 1969."'15
THE COMMISSIONER'S PUBLIC POLICY REGULATIONS

On December 6, 1972, the Commissioner published a package of proposed
regulations, purportedly "to conform the Income Tax Regulations... under
sections 61, 162, 212, and 471 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to section
902 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969."'119
First, with respect to section 162, the only code section actually amended by
153.

Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. 111, §310(a), 85 Stat. 525 (1971)

(codified at I.R.C. §162(c)).

154. Id.
155. Id.
156. S. REP. No. 92-437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), 1972-1 C.B. 559, 599.
157. The amendment creating §162(c)(3), relating to Medicare- and Medicaid-related

kickbacks, did use the word "rebate," and presumably was intended to operate upon rebates
otherwise characterized as deductions. Pub. L. No. 92-178, tit. 111, §310(a), 85 Stat. 525 (1971).
158. 1972-1 C.B. at 599.
159.

PRoPosED TREAs. RaG. §§1.61-3, 1.162-1, 1.162-18, 1.162-21, 1.212-1, 1.471-3, 37 Fed.

Reg. 25936 (1972).
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the two acts which the regulations purport to interpret, final amended regulations were adopted on February 20, 1975160 affecting three paragraphs. 161 The
regulations acknowledge the congressional intent to supercede all prior decisons
involving the disallowance of deductions on grounds of public policy. Implementing that intent, Treasury Regulation section 1.162-1 provides:
A deduction for an expense paid or incurred after December 30, 1969,
which would otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall not be
denied on the grounds that allowance of such deduction would frustrate
a sharply defined public
policy. See section 162(c), (f) and (g) and the
162
regulations thereunder.
Amendments to Regulation section 1.162-18 set forth the interpretations of
Code section 162(c) as amended by the 1969 and 1971 acts, 163 while Regulation
section 1.162-21 sets forth interpretations of section 162(f)164 dealing with fines
and penalties.
The final regulations also contain amendments to Regulation section
1.212-1.265 The thrust of this amendment was to conform the test of section 212
deductions for expenses incurred in the production of income to the new
standards enacted by Congress for testing business deductions under section 162.
Though Congress did not specifically amend section 212 in 1969 and 1971, it

seems dear that the public policy doctrine in effect prior to 1969 was applicable
to deductions under section 212 as well as section 162.166 Thus, amendments to
the regulations under section 212 seem consistent with congressional intent.
In addition to amendments to the regulations under sections 162 and 212,
the Commissioner also amended regulations under both sections 61 and 471 of
the Code.167 The amendment to Regulation section 1.61-3(a) provides that
"gross income is determined without subtraction of... amounts which are of
a type for which a deduction would be disallowed under section 162(c), (f), or
(g) in the case of a business expense."' 68 Consistent with this interpretation of
section 61, the amendment to Regulation section 1.471-8 provides that the
160. TiD. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
161. TRaAs. RaG. §§1.162-1 (relating to business expenses), 1.162-18 (relating to illegal
bribes and kickbacks), 1.162-21 (relating to fines and penalties), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
162. TRnms. REG. §1.162-1, T.D. 745, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
163. TREAs. REG. §1.162-18, T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51. These regulations are examined in
Meltzer, Are Proposed Kickback Regulations an Unwarranted Extension of the Code?, 58 J.
TAx. 166 (1973); Note, Federal Income Taxation-Public Policy and the Deductibility of
Kickbacks Under §162((cX2), 35 OHIO ST. LJ.686 (1974).
164. T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51, amended by, T.D. 7366, 1975-2 C.B. 64.

165. A new subparagraph (p) titled "Frustration of Public Policy" was added to TaYAs.
REo. §1.212-1, T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.

166. A search of §212 revealed no cases in which the public policy doctrine was used to
disallow a deduction under that section.
167. Amendments to TREAs. REG. §1.61-3(a) proposed on December 6, 1972, as part of the
"package" to conform the regulations to the "public policy" legislation in 1969 and 1971 (see
note 159 supra), were separately adopted in final form on September 19, 1973, in Ti). 7285,
1973-2 C.B. 168, while the proposed amendment to TREAS. REG. §1.471-3 (Inventories at Cost)
was finalized along with the rest of the same package on February 20, 1975. T.D. 7345, 1975-1
C.B. 51.
168. TREms. REG. 1.61-3(a), Ti). 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 165.
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"cost" of inventories shall not include any amount which is of a type for which
a deduction would be disallowed under section 162(c), (f), or (g), and regulations thereunder, in the case of a business expense. In the introductory notes to
Treasury Decision 7345, the Commissioner offers the explanation that the
amendments to the regulations under sections 61 and 471 are designed to prevent the congressional intent as embodied in the 1969 and 1971 public policy
legislation from being circumvented by the allowance under those sections of
deductions which Congress explicitly denied by its amendments to section
162.169

In the author's view, the final regulations under both sections 61 and 471
represent clearly unwarranted and unauthorized extensions of Congress' 1969
and 1971 public policy legislation amending Code section 162. Moreover, they
are in irreconcilable conflict with virtually all relevant decisions based on pre1969 law. The clear thrust of these regulations is to accomplish by administrative fiat that which both the courts and the Congress had clearly and deliberately refused to attempt, that is, the extension of the public policy doctrine
to the area of pre-gross income adjustments.
Regulation section 1.61-3(a), as now amended, clearly defies the Tax Court
decisions in the milk rebate cases. 170 In Revenue Ruling 77-244,'17 the Commissioner dramatized the effect of the new section 61 regulation by applying it
in a factual context so similar to the facts in PittsburghMilk as to render the
two cases indistinguishable. Thus, although the rebates described in the ruling
were properly cast as subtractions from gross sales in determining gross income,
Regulation section 1.61-3(a) nevertheless called for those subtractions to be
subjected to the tests prescribed in Code section 162(c)(2), which resulted under
the assumed facts in their disallowance as an adjustment in the computation of
gross income.
RELEVANT DECISIONS UNDER THE NEW LAW

Having originally nonacquiesced in the Pittsburgh Milk decision,172 the
Commissioner shifted his ground and acquiesced 73 after the last two milk
rebate cases 7 4 were decided adversely to his position in April, 1961. However,
after the adoption of his final regulations interpreting and supplementing
Congress' public policy legislation, the Commissioner was prepared to relitigate the question of the public policy doctrine as applied to pre-gross in169. T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
170. Curiously, while the amendment to TaREAs. REG. §1.61-3(a) was adopted (apart from
the rest of the public policy amendments) on September 19, 1973, T.D. 7285, 1973-2 C.B. 163,
the Commissioner continued to acquiesce in the Pittsburgh Milk decision until 1976. See
1976-2 C.B. 3 where the Commissioner withdrew his acquiescence in Pittsburgh Milk Co.,
Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., Lela Sullenger; and 1977-1 C.B. 2, where the Commissioner
withdrew his acquiescence in Allen Schiffman.
171. Rev. Rul. 74-244, 1977-2 C.B. 58.
172. 1959-1 C.B. 6.
173. 1962-2 C.B. 5.
174. Atzingen-Whitehouse Dairy, Inc., 36 T.C. 173 (1961), Bloomingdale Dairy Co., Inc.,
20 T.C.M. (CCH) 24,803 (1961).
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come adjustments. In anticipation of the trial of his first case 1 5 he withdrew
his acquiescence in the Pittsburgh Milk decision on August 16, 1976, substituting a nonacquiescence. 78
The Sobel Case
The first case decided involving the Commissioner's renewed effort to apply
the public policy standards to pre-gross income adjustments was Max Sobel
Wholesale Liquors77 In that case, the petitioner was a California corporation engaged as a liquor wholesaler in the San Francisco Bay area. Petitioner
was licensed under the California liquor laws by the Department of Alcoholic
Beverage Control of the State of California. California law required that
liquor wholesalers file, or "post," each month the selling prices for liquor and
wine to be sold by them. Sales at prices varying from the posted prices constituted violations of California law. The prices posted by the wholesalers were
"suggested" by producers and importers, and a wholesaler who refused to post
and sell at such suggested prices ran the risk that the supplier would terminate
his right to distribute the products.
Notwithstanding the posted prices, wholesale dealers in the San Francisco
Bay area, including the petitioner, offered credits, discounts, and rebates to
preferred customers in order to keep their business. Petitioner utilized a
"credit" arrangement with select customers whereby the purchase of stated
quantities of specific brands, at posted prices would entitle the customer to a
"credit" with which the customer could acquire additional spirits without
further consideration.
The Tax Court viewed such arrangements as rebates "in kind," indistinguishable from cash rebates, and stated the issue for decision as "whether such
rebates, regardless of form, come within the scope of section 162(c)."' 78
The court's first inquiry was whether the rebates constituted an illegal
bribe, kickback, or other illegal payment otherwise deductible under section
162(a). 7 9 Reviewing the milk rebate decisions and finding those cases factually
indistinguishable, the court concluded that the payments in question were not
deductions, but reductions of gross income. 80
The Commissioner argued that PittsburghMilk had been overruled by the
United States Supreme Court in Tank Truck Rentals v. Commissioner'81 as
well as in Commissionerv. Tellier.9 2 Finding both contentions "wholly lacking
in merit," 18 3 the court also commented on the inconsistency of the Commis175. Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors, 69 T.C. 477 (1977).
176. 1976-2 C.B. 3.

177. 69 T.C. 477 (1977).
178. Id. at 481-82.
179. Id. at 482.
180. Id. at 483.
181. 856 U.S. 30 (1958).
182. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).

183. 69 T.C. at 484. The Commissioner's argument that Tank Truck Rentals overruled
Pittsburgh Milk had been raised and rejected by the Tax Court in Harmony Dairy Co., 19

T.C.M. (CCH) 924,203 (1960).
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sioner's argument with his tax policy relating to Pittsburgh Milk as expressed
during previous years. The court noted that the Commissioner had announced
his acquiescence in PittsburghMilk after the Supreme Court's decision in Tank
Truck Rentals.18 4 Moreover, he had not withdrawn his acquiescence in Pittsburgh Milk until ten years after the Supreme Court had decided Tellier.
The court next considered the Commissioner's contention that the 1969 and
1971 public policy legislation had overruled Pittsburgh Milk and related decisions. Concluding that the legislation dealt only with deductions while Pittsburgh Milk involved exclusions from gross income, the court refused to infer
that Congress had intended to overrule those decisions. 8 5 To the contrary, the
court attributed to Congress knowledge of the milk rebate decisions at the time
it enacted the 1969 legislation and reasoned that had Congress intended to
overrule those decisions it would have done so with specificity and not by
implication. Finding no evidence of such congressional intent in either the
statute or the committee reports, the court confirmed the continuing vitality of
PittsburghMilk and related decisions. 18 6
Having thus reconfirmed Pittsburgh Milk, the court examined the Commissioner's new regulations under sections 61 and 471. It avoided a decision on
the validity of the regulations by assuming without deciding that they were
valid but announced that it would interpret both regulations so as to confine
them to an extremely narrow scope of operation:
In our opinion, assuming the validity of the regulations, the rule
stated would not apply in the case before the Court. Depending upon the
nature of the business, the cost of goods sold may include material, labor,
and overhead. There may be certain expenses of a dual character which
may be chargeable either to overhead in the cost of goods sold or deducted as administrative or sales expense. In any event, the Court would
limit the regulations as to preclude the deductibility of an illegal payment charged to overhead in the cost of sales of the type which might
otherwise be deductible as administrative or sales expenses. A typical example would be a bribe given for the purpose of obtaining goods or for
the purpose8 of expediting its delivery to the taxpayer for manufacture
and resale.1 7
The petitioner had included as part of its cost of goods sold amounts representing the cost of inventory given to customers in consideration of the
"credits." Applying its restrictive interpretation of the Commissioner's new
regulations, the court held that such costs did not constitute an overhead or
indirect expense charged to the cost of sales and thus were not "of a type" for
which a deduction would be disallowed under section 162(c)(2).188 Accordingly,
it held the rebates in question to be proper and allowable deductions from
gross sales when tested under the Commissioner's regulations.
The decision in Sobel was reviewed by the entire Tax Court. Judge Dren184. 1959-1 C.B. 6.
185. 69 T.C. at 484-85.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 485.
188. Id.
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nen wrote a dissenting opinion, with Judges Fay, Dawson, and Wiles concurring with his dissent.189 The four dissenting judges did not disagree with any of
the principles expressed in the majority opinion, but indicated they would
have reached a different conclusion under the somewhat peculiar facts of the
case on grounds not considered by the majority. Pointing out that the "additional" merchandise was delivered to petitioner's customers at no additional
charge in satisfaction of the credits recorded in petitioner's "black book," they
would have disposed of the case on the ground that these subsequent transactions did not constitute "sales."190 Citing with apparent approval the Sul1 and Hofferbert92 decisions for the principle that the cost of goods sold
lenger'9
is properly deducted from gross receipts to prevent the taxation of "more than
gross income," the dissent nevertheless argued for an exception under the
peculiar facts in Sobel: "But surely the cost of merchandise that is not sold but
is in fact given away, under whatever scheme may be devised, should not enter
into the computation of profit or gross income from the disposition of merchandise in a transaction that produces no gross receipts."19 s
In support of the conclusion he would have reached in Sobel, Judge Drennen cited a line of decisions'" holding that the cost of merchandise withdrawn
from inventory for the personal use and benefit of the merchant may not be
included in the cost of goods sold. Judge Drennen concluded that while the
"ecost" of the merchandise given in satisfaction of the credit might be a cost of
doing business to the petitioner, he would have required petitioner to prove its
deductibility in some way other than by adding it to the cost of goods sold.19
Significantly, the dissent expressed no disapproval of the Pittsburgh Milk
decision, but found it to be distinguishable from Sobel on its facts. e

The Alex Case
The second post-1969 case involving the application of the public policy

doctrine to pre-gross income adjustments resulted in a victory for the Commissioner that was greater than he had sought. In James Alex,197 a case before
the Tax Court involving facts similar to those in Schiffman,191 the Commissioner sought only to distinguish Schiffman on its facts, yet a sharply divided
court 99 decided instead to overrule Schiffman. In Alex the petitioner was a
licensed California life insurance agent for Jefferson National Life Insurance
189. Id. at 486.

190. Id. at 487.
191. Lela Sullenger, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948).
192. Hofferbert v. Anderson Oldsmobile Inc., 197 F.2d 504 (4th Cir. 1952).
193. 69 T.C. at 487.

194. Id. See Demor, Inc., 27 T.C.M. (CCH) f29,257 (1968); Appeal of P.P. Sweeten, 3
B.T.A. 37 (1925). See also City Ice Delivery Co. v. United States, 176 F.2d 347 (4th Cir. 1949).
195. 69 T.C. at 488.
196. Id.
197. 70 T.C. No. 29 (May 24, 1978).
198. Allen Schiffian, 47 T.C. 537 (1967).
199. Judge Wilbur wrote a concurring opinion in which Judges Drennen, Dawson,
Simpson, Sterrett, and Wiles concurred. Of the seven judges who dissented, four wrote
separate opinions.
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Company (Jefferson). Under the terms of his agreement with Jefferson, petitioner saw an opportunity to maximize his agency commissions by adopting a
scheme for rebating or discounting premiums to the customer so that, in net
effect, the customer could obtain the first two years coverage with little or no
cash outlay. He developed two separate plans, one involving a rebate of the
commission to the customer and the other involving a discount of a substantial
part of the premium. Both plans represented violations of California's insurance laws.
The issue for decision was whether the rebates and discounts given by
petitioner constituted a downward adjustment to petitioner's gross income, or
were business expenses deductible under section 162. Petitioner conceded that
if the latter were the case, such deductions would be disallowed by section
162(c)(2).
In the majority opinion, written by Judge Tannenwald, the court reaffirmed the conclusion it had announced in Sobel: section 162(c) did not
change the principle established in earlier cases, that discounts or rebates from
the purchase price are generally treated as price adjustments and thus are exclusions from gross income. Reviewing those earlier cases, the court recognized
that in all but Schiffman the discount or rebate was arranged by the seller directly with the buyer. In Schiffman, however, the court had concluded that the
issue did not turn on whether the rebates or discounts resulted from dealings
between buyer and seller 20 0 and had permitted customer rebates and discounts
of insurance premiums to be treated as exclusions from gross income.
In a nine-to-seven decision grounded completely on policy considerations
and marked by sharp dissents, the court held that the petitioner's discounts and
rebates to customers were not properly excluded from gross income, but would
have to stand the test as business deductions. In reaching this decision, the court
felt compelled to recede from its ruling in Schiffman which had extended the
Pittsburgh Milk doctrine to rebates of commissions between agents and
principals:
After careful consideration, we now think that any claim of exclusion
from gross income, based upon an adjustment to the purchase price resulting from a discount or rebate, should at most be available only to the
buyer or the seller and that our decision in
Schiffman is inconsistent
20 1
with this principle and should be overruled.
Thus, from Alex emerged the principle that if the person giving the discount or rebate is not the seller, but a commercial middleman, there can be no
selling price to which any adjustment as to him might be applied. Thus, any
tax benefit to such person must come by way of a deduction from gross income
if available under the statutes.
In a concurring opinion,2 0 2 Judge Wilbur compared the Schiffman rule to
200. In fact, the Schiffman case had turned on the court's application of the claim of
right doctrine. See 47 T.C. at 541, and text accompanying note 209 infra.
201. 70 T.C. No. 29 at 2873.
202. Id. at 2874.
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the principle represented by Jack Williams,208 a case in which a real estate salesman buying real estate from his employer and receiving commissions therefor
was required to treat those commissions as gross income rather than as an adjustment to the purchase price. He noted a great inconsistency between the
Williams and the Schiffman decisions. In the latter the taxpayer had been
permitted to exclude commissions which he had rebated to customers.
Ultimately, the concurring opinion, like the majority opinion, revealed
that it was primarily policy-based:
Indeed petitioner's interpretation would, at the minimum, potentially remove virtually all commission income from the scope of section
162(c)(2): This would be anomalous in the extreme since the kickback of
commission income was a significant if not predominant part of the evil
Congress perceived in enacting section 162(c)(2).
is
The asymmetrical treatment of above and below the line illegality
20 4
no tribute to judicial logic. It should be narrowly circumscribed.
The dissenting opinions objected to the decision on various grounds. Judge
Raum considered that Schiffman, though a close case, had been correctly decided and should not be overruled.205 Judge Quealy noted, with irony, that the
majority had gratuitously overruled Schiffman when the Commissioner had not
asked the court to do SO, 2 06 in a case involving a taxable year during which
Schiffman not only represented the rule of the Tax Court, but was acquiesced
in by the Commissioner. 207 Under those circumstances, he would not have overruled Schiffman unless Congress had so intended, which, he concluded, was not
the case.
Judge Goffe objected to overruling the Schiffman case, particularly in view
of the failure of the Commissioner to contend for such a result, on grounds that
it unfairly deprived the petitioners of the opportunity to defend the Schiffman decision and offended the doctrine of stare decisis. He pointed out that the
Schiffman decision had never been criticized in any court opinion since it had
been entered eleven years earlier; that it had been acquiesced in by the Commissioner until shortly before the Alex case arose; and that the Commissioner
had not asked for it to be overruled. Judge Goffe asserted that under such circumstances, the petitioner had every right to rely on Schiffman as reflecting the
208
law on the subject in the Tax Court.
Judge Goffe also pointed out that the majority overruled Schiffman without
even discussing the claim of right doctrine upon which the Schiffman court had
expressly rested its conclusions. Analyzing that doctrine himself, he concluded
that the petitioner had no claim of right to the commissions which he had
agreed to rebate or discount: "I strongly oppose warping the claim of right

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

64 T.C. 1085 (1975).
77 T.C. No. 29 at 2878.
Id. at 2879.
Id.
Acquiesced in, 1967-2 C.B. 3; nonacquiesced in, 1977-2 C.B. 2.
77 T.C. No. 29 at 2881.
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doctrine in favor of respondent when he didn't ask for it to construct phantom
income and a phantom deduction that must be denied under section 162(c)." 20 9
A fourth dissenting opinion was written by Judge Chabot, and reflected four
points of disagreement.210 First, the majority's stated reason for its decision,
that is, an opposite decision would "open the door to wholesale evasion of the
purposes of section 162(c)," was wholly unsubstantiated in the record. During
the eleven years since the Schiffman decision had been entered, the mischievous
potential which the majority attributed to it had not been demonstrated before
any court.
Second, in deciding Schiffman, the court had not been impressed by the
Commissioner's effort to distinguish that case from the milk rebate cases. Judge
Chabot contended that the Alex majority did not explain why now, in Alex, it
considered such a distinction justified. The main thrust of his opinion was to
point out the lack of any effort by the majority to support its decision on other
than policy-oriented grounds. The latter ground, namely, "the floodgate to
abuses" argument, Chabot considered to be unsupported.
Third, the decision produced bad law which might distort results in unrelated issues involving distinctions between gross income adjustments and
business deductions. Fourth, the Ostheimer21 , and Williams 212 cases had been
distinguished in the Schiffman decision, and neither the majority nor concurring opinions in Alex gave any reason for rejecting the court's earlier analysis
of those cases.
The Alex decision, now on appeal to the Ninth Circuit, seems difficult to
justify. Though the majority rested its decision, in language conveying almost
a sense of urgency, on the assertion that a contrary decision would open the
door to wholesale evasion of the purposes of section 162(c), the Commissioner's
failure to seek the overruling of Schiffman would lead one to discount the
threat of such abuses. Also significant is the fact that the Schiffman decision
preceded the amendment of section 162(c) in the Tax Reform Act of 1969 by
two years and the expansion of that subsection in the Revenue Act of 1971 by
four years. If Congress considered the Schiffman decision a threat to the policy
underlying section 162(c), neither the statute nor the committee reports reflect
any such concern. In the absence of congressional objection to the Schiffman
decision, the policy grounds relied on by the court seem conjectural at best,
and the court's unsolicited reversal of Schiffman without opportunity for debate by the litigants seems unduly harsh.
As for the reliance placed on the Ostheimer21 3 and Williams 214 cases in
209.

Id. at 2882.

210. Id.
211. Ostheimer v. United States, 264 F.2d 789 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959).
212. Jack Williams, 64 T.C. 1085 (1975).
213. Ostheimer v. United States, 264 F.2d 789 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959).
Petitioner, a life insurance agent, received commissions on premiums which he had placed on
the lives of his partner, key employees, and children. Although petitioner argued that the
commissions constituted rebates and, as such, reduced the price of the policies, the court found
that since state law prohibited the rebating of insurance commissions, the payments could not
have constituted rebate. Rather, the commissions were gross income to the taxpayer.
214. In Jack Williams, 64 T.C. 1085 (1975), petitioner, a real estate salesman, received
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Judge Wilbur's concurring opinion, there would seem to be real distinctions
between the facts in those cases and those before the court in Alex. Ostheimer
and Williams represented no new law in the Tax Court. The same principles
had been established prior to Schifiman, as reflected in Commissioner v.
Daehler22s and George E. Bailey.216 The latter decisions were advanced by the
Commissioner and distinguished by the Tax Court in Schiffman with the fol-

lowing explanation:
In those cases, it can at least be maintained that the taxpayer did receive
something as compensation in connection with his employment, namely,
the excess of the fair market value of the item over what he paid for it.
By way of contrast, petitioner herein neither realized nor could have
17
realized anything beyond the amount he actually reported as income.2
The foregoing analysis, relied upon by the Schiffman court as a rationale
for distinguishing the principles reflected in the Ostheimer and Williams cases,
seems valid, at least to the author. Yet Judge Wilbur's concurring opinion in
Alex reversed the view reflected in the above-quoted excerpt from Schiffman
with only the following explanation:
It is difficult to see how "commissions" on [sic] "discounts" must be included in gross income when a partner, your children, or even the salespersons themselves are the purchasers, but may be excluded where a
typical customer is involved. If the former is includable, a fortiori, so is
the latter.218
The policy and doctrinal bases for decision in Alex are now being examined
by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. However that court might evaluate the
issues, the case is, in Judge Raum's words, a close one,21 9 and further litigation
in other courts might well be expected before the issue can be considered
settled.
CONCLUSION

It seems clear that the Commissioner will continue and probably expand
his effort to impose public policy considerations as a limitation upon the allowance of pre-gross income adjustments. The unexpected proportions of his
success before the Tax Court in Alex can only serve to encourage probes into
220
other aspects of this question.
commissions on each consummated sale arranged by him. He purchased property for his account and received, in that year, a commission on those transactions. In the same year

petitioner reacquired property from a third person to whom he had originally sold the prop.
erty. He argued that in both instances the commissions he received were excluded from in-

come, constituting a reduction in the purchase price of the property. The Tax Court held
that the amounts in quetion were compensation for services.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
the Tax

281 F.2d 823 (5th Cir. 1960), rev'g, 31 T.C. 722 (1959).
41 T.C. 663 (1964).
47 T.C. 557, 542 (1967).
James Alex, 70 T.C. at 322.
Id. at 2879 (Raum, J., dissenting).
The case of Haas Brothers, Inc., docket No. 5219-76, is currently awaiting decision in
Court.
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It is highly unlikely that any court would conclude that Congress intended
to deal with the subject of pre-gross income adjustments in the public policy
222
provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1969,221 or in the 1971 Amendments.
The statutory language itself, its placement in the Code, and the committee
explanations all make it quite clear that Congress intended the scope of its
legislation to be coterminous with the concept of deductions from gross income.
With the exception of emergency legislation enacted under its war powers
during World War II and the Korean conflict, 223 Congress has never attempted
to apply the income tax beyond the traditional and supposed constitutional
barrier of gross income.
If Congress did not intend, in its 1969 and 1971 public policy legislation, to
change existing decisional law relating to the allowance of pre-gross income
adjustments, questionable conclusions may be reached as to the validity of (1)
Regulation section 1.61-3(a), providing that gross income may not be reduced
by payments which would not qualify for deduction under the public policy
provisions of section 162, and (2) Regulation section 1.471-3(a), providing that
cost of goods sold may not be increased by payments not qualifying for deduction under those same provisions. Except for Weather-Seal and related
cases, which subsequent decisions reveal to be limited as precedent to the
unusual wartime wage and price control statutes there involved, the decisions
under pre-1969 law confirm gross income as the upper limit for application of
the public policy doctrine. Clearly, then, the regulations in question are not
consistent with, or declaratory of, the existing decisional law.
In announcing the adoption of the final regulations, Treasury Decision 7345
suggests that changes in the regulations under section 61 and section 471 were
necessary in order that the congressional intent underlying the 1969 and 1971
amendments to section 162 would not be frustrated by the allowance of items
under section 61 and section 471 which would be subject to disallowance under
section 162. It is reasonable to presume that Congress would have enacted
legislation in 1969 and 1971 to correct the uneven application of the public
policy doctrine to above and below-the-line items (1) if it considered such
legislation to be within its constitutional authority, and (2) if it had decided,
as a matter of legislative policy, to apply the federal income tax beyond the
traditional limit of gross income. Congress having taken no such measures, one
must conclude that the regulations in question are wholly without statutory
authorization. In the author's view, they raise the very constitutional issues
which Congress, since the adoption of the sixteenth amendment, has seen fit to
avoid.
The Sobel case represents the first occasion for judicial scrutiny of those
regulations. Although in that case the Tax Court assumed without deciding
their validity, it emasculated them with an extremely narrow construction.224
221. See note 142 supra.
222. See note 153 supra.

223. See text accompanying notes 48-82 supra.
224. While technically Sobel dealt only with an adjustment to cost of goods sold, and thus

involved only Treasury Regulation §1.471-3(d), it seems clear that the Tax Court would limit

the scope of Treasury Regulation §1.61-3(a) to the same extent.
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According to this construction, the regulations could apply only to those
"borderline" items which reasonably could be classified either in an "abovethe-line" category or a "below-the-line" category. 225
In principle, the application of the public policy doctrine to such borderline items seems reasonable. Presumably, the same result could be reached in a
future case before the Tax Court, even if the Sobel court had declared the
regulations invalid on their face, by a judicial finding that the borderline item
in question was properly classified as a deduction from gross income and not
as a pre-gross income adjustment. Moreover, had the court interpreted the
regulations literally, as subjecting all items adjusting gross income to the public
policy tests of section 162, it would have found it necessary to determine their
validity by considering and deciding the obvious constitutional question which
they raise. The avoidance of such constitutional issues by construction, even
strained construction, has long been accepted as sound judicial policy.
The Sobel and Alex decisions prompt the inquiry whether the Sullenger and
Pittsburgh Milk line of decisions are still operative. If the Commissioner's
regulations might be analogized to a fifth column effort to infiltrate and
undermine the vitality of Pittsburgh Milk and Sullenger, Sobel represents a
frontal assault on those decisions. Not only did the Commissioner argue that
Congress had impliedly overruled Pittsburgh Milk in its 1969 and 1971 legislation, but he also resurrected the argument, rejected earlier by the Tax Court
in the Harmony Dairy case, 226 that PittsburghMilk had been overruled by the
Supreme Court decision in Tank Truck Rentals. The Sobel court noted that
the Commissioner had withdrawn his nonacquiescence in Pittsburgh Milk and
substituted an acquiescence after the Supreme Court's decision in Tank Truck
Rentals. The court, considering the Tank Truck Rentals and Tellier arguments together, rejected both positions as "wholly lacking in merit."
It is significant that the four dissenters in Sobel advanced no criticism whatsoever either of the PittsburghMilk or Sullenger decisions, but instead acknowledged the continuing vitality of both. They argued as the basis for their dissent
that a taxpayer should not be allowed to report as cost of goods sold the cost of
merchandise which was not sold by the taxpayer but given away. Their reference here was to the fact that the petitioner had "given" merchandise to its
customers in satisfaction of "credits," receiving no additional consideration.227
Since the merchandise had not been sold, the dissenters would have required
the petitioner to establish any right to tax benefit for its cost "in some way
other than by including it in the cost of goods sold."
The Alex decision terminates, at least in the Tax Court, the "Schiffman
extension" of the PittsburghMilk rule. At the same time, the majority opinion
dearly reconfirms that the 1969 and 1971 legislation has not devitalized Pittsburgh Milk and other cases in that line. After Alex, the exclusion from gross
income of amounts rebated back to the purchaser pursuant to a previous agreement is available (at least in the Tax Court), only to a principal in the trans225. Max Sobel Wholesale Liquors, 69 T.C. 477,485 (1977).
226. Id. at 483. Harmony Dairy Co., 19 T.C.M. (CCH) g24,203 (1960).
227. 69 T.C. at 486-88 (Drennan, J., dissenting).
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action, that is, to the seller and not to an agent. When the seller's agent, by
agreement entered into prior to the transaction, returns a portion of his commission to the purchaser, he must, if Alex becomes general law, include the
full amount of the commission in gross income and look to section 162 for
deduction of the rebated amount. If the rebate arrangement runs afoul of
section 162(c)(2), he will lose his deduction and thus will experience phantom
income. While Alex will confine the future scope of application of the Pittsburgh Milk doctrine to rebates and discounts between principals, it does nothing to devitalize the PittsburghMilk ruling itself.
In view of the consideration given in this article to the Weather-Seal line of
cases, it seems appropriate to conclude with an evaluation of its status in the
current law. It is of interest that the Tax Court's interpretation of the regulations under sections 61 and 471 does not reflect an adherence to the rule in
Weather-Seal. Accordingly, direct labor compensation, properly chargeable to
cost of goods sold, will not be isolated as a special class of pre-gross income adjustments which may be disallowed on grounds of public policy. Though the
Sobel case did not involve such direct labor charges, there is little doubt that,
viewed as a separate class of expenditures, they would not fall within the
narrow scope of operation to which the Tax Court will restrict the Commissioner's regulations.
The Weather-Sealdecision has admittedly influenced the outcome of several
cases decided subsequently by the Tax Court. One of the doctrinal anomolies
resulting from the application of Weather-Seal is seen in the Reynolds Tobacco
case where, in a memorandum decision, 228 Judge Fisher cited Weather-Seal as
authority for his holding that direct cost wages may be disallowed to the extent
they are found unreasonable in amount. His holding, which the author believes
to be incorrect, was reviewed neither by the entire Tax Court nor by the Fourth
Circuit on appeal, and should not be considered as the settled law on this issue
in the Tax Court or in any other court jurisdiction.
It is of interest to note that in more recent post-war price control legislation Congress has not attempted to legislate or authorize disallowance of the
over-ceiling portion of wages or price payments as a part of the price control
legislative package. Apparently, Congress is satisfied with the disallowance
mechanisms of section 162(c). At the same time, one notes the Commissioner's
national policy of applying Regulation section 1.471-3 to disallow, as cost of
goods sold, the over-ceiling portion of amounts paid as rent, wages, or prices in
violation of the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 and Executive Order 14660
issued thereunder.229 Curiously, the Weather-Seal decision is not relied on by
the Commissioner as its authority for Revenue Ruling 72-236.23 0
228. 15 T.C.M. 810 (1956). See note 57, supra for a discussion of Reynolds Tobacco.
229. This latter point should now be considered inoperative in light of the Tax Court's
interpretation of the regulations announced in Sobel. With respect to items properly classified
as part of cost of goods sold, Sobel, Sullenger and related decisions continue to assure their
allowance in computing gross income.
230. Revenue Ruling 72-236, 1972-1 C.B. 41, addresses the question whether amounts of
wages, salaries, rent, and price payments in excess of the amount permitted under Executive
Order 11640 (issued pursuant to the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970), are deductible as
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There is no present indication of intention on the part of the Internal
Revenue Service to recant from the position it advocated in Sobel and Alex.
In fact, a third case, involving similar issues, has already been tried and is
awaiting decision in the Tax Court. 231 This decision, and the Ninth Circuit's
disposition of Sobel and Alex, will have considerable influence upon the Com232
missioner's future policy in this area.
It will no doubt continue to discomfit some jurists that the law dictates
opposite results for payments which violate the public policy concepts articulated in section 162, depending upon whether such payments are classified as
above the gross income line or below it. However, it is the author's view that
such "asymmetrical treatment of above and below the line illegality" 233 is not,
as one Tax Court judge has implied, a malfunction of judicial logic. To deny,
for any reason, an allowance properly accounted for as an offset to gross income, is tantamount to taxing income when none has been earned. The taxation of gross sales or gross receipts under the guise of income taxation is not
authorized by the sixteenth amendment. It is a credit and not an embarrassment to the judiciary that the fundamental and necessary distinctions between
pre-gross income adjustments and deductions have been preserved intact, particularly against the ever-present temptation produced by the public policy
cases to permit such distinctions to erode and be forgotten.
business expenses under IRC §162(c)(2). Neither the Economic Stabilization Act nor the
Executive Order provided (as had their wartime predecessors) that amounts illegally paid
would be disregarded in calculating cost for tax purposes. However, both the law and the
Executive Order prescribed fines for violations.

Applying the provision of §162(c)(2), the ruling concludes that the illegally excessive portion of a payment for rent, wages or goods is not allowable as a business deduction under
§162. It goes further, however, and noting Treasury Regulation §1.471-3 (then only proposed
but later adopted without change), concludes that no illegal rent, wage or price may be included in cost of goods sold.
231. Haas Bros., Inc., Tax Court, docket no. 5219-76.
232. Should the Ninth Circuit affirm the Tax Court's decisions in Sobel and Alex, the
Commissioner may well seek a conflicting decision in another circuit. It should seem unlikely that the Commissioner would seek to obtain such a decision in the First, Fourth, Fifth
and Tenth Circuits in light of decisions in those courts affirming and approving of the
Sullenger decision, in which the fundamental issue was identical to that in Pittsburgh Milk.
233. See James Alex, 70 T.C. 322 (1978).
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